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POLICING L.A.’S SKID ROW:
CRIME AND REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT IN DOWNTOWN LOS ANGELES
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So the whole battle going on in [Skid] Row, as any great big battle is ever
about, is about real estate. That’s all it’s about. It’s about real estate…. Who is
going to win the real estate. If we can buy enough of these buildings…
Alice Callahan, L.A. Skid Row homeless advocate2
I actually believe that on some level the existence of poor and potentially
homeless people or borderline people is not antithetical to a healthy urban
environment….
Tom Gilmore, L.A. Skid Row real estate developer3
Introduction
Times Square. The Bowery. Downtown L.A. The Near-West side of Chicago. These
disorderly neighborhoods of our major urban centers, these magnets for the destitute, these
Skid Rows of America were the center of heated debate and much political initiative at the
turn of the twenty-first century.4 Some, like Chicago’s Near-West side, vanished—bulldozed
down, re-engineered, the beneficiary (or victim) of a massive urban renewal project. In
Chicago, the single-room occupancy hotels (“SROs”) and flophouses were gutted, the
missions and saloons were closed, and in their place rose high-end, residential apartments—
the Presidential Towers, four 49-story modern high-security towers with over 2,300
apartments and over 900 spaces of sheltered parking.5 Others, like Times Square, had radical
surgery—massive, planned, precision redevelopment. While some of the landmark buildings
and theatres were refurbished, office towers and corporate, commercial, and media
headquarters rose in their midst. Times Square morphed from red lights to large-scale LED
displays and signage, and became a vibrant and luxurious commercial, hotel, media,
2

Interview with Alice Callahan, Homeless Advocate, in Los Angeles (Sept 11, 2004).
Interview with Tom Gilmore, Real Estate Developer, in Los Angeles (Sept 10, 2004).
4
See especially Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: Of Panhanlders,
Skid Rows, and Public-Space Zoning, 105 Yale L J 1165, 1167–1173, 1202–1219 (1996) (describing the
evolution of Skid Rows in America during the late twentieth century, the academic and legal debates, and the
range of political initiatives addressed to street disorder). For earlier historical and sociological treatments of
American Skid Rows, see Donald J. Bogue, Skid Row in American Cities (Chicago 1963); Jacqueline P.
Wiseman, Stations of the Lost: The Treatment of Skid Row Alcholics (Chicago 1979); William McSheehy,
Skid Row (G.K. Hall & Co. 1979); Allen Z. Gammage, David L. Jorgensen, and Eleanor M. Jorgensen,
Alcoholism, Skid Row and the Police (Charles C. Thomas 1972); and before that, the classic, Nels Anderson,
The Hobo: The Sociology of the Homeless Man (Chicago 1961).
5
For fascinating discussions of the elimination of Chicago’s Near West Side Skid Row, see Ross Miller,
Here’s The Deal: The Buying and Selling of a Great American City 3–93(Knopf 1996); Anthony Ijomah, The
Role of Major Institutions in the Redevelopment of Chicago’s Near West Side, 1940–1990 (Ph.D. dissertation)
(University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee 1991); and Ronald Miller, The Demolition of Skid Row, 8–35
(Lexington 1982). For a description of Presidential Towers, see Paul Gapp, Presidential Towers No Beauty,
But It Works Like A Charm, Chi Trib, Arts 6 (Dec 22, 1985).
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business and entertainment center.6 Still others, like Los Angeles’ Downtown, welcome the
twenty-first century relatively intact.
Among criminal law scholars, sociologists, and students of policing, New York City
drew the most attention. A well-publicized clash between former New York City mayor
Rudolph Giuliani and his first police commissioner, William Bratton, took the limelight, and
fed a rancorous debate over the effectiveness of New York-style “broken-windows”
policing—or more exactly, who should get credit.7 A larger question emerged from those
debates: Did order-maintenance policing and the NYPD’s aggressive policy of stop-andfrisk searches and misdemeanor arrests really bring down the crime rate in New York City
and transform disorderly neighborhoods like Times Square into high-end, commerciallyviable, urban communities?8 Many researchers explored this question, focusing specifically
on the role of misdemeanor law enforcement and its potential effect on crime.9 In this
literature, the NYPD appeared to be the lead protagonist and crime reduction the dominant
plot in New York City’s urban renewal of the mid- to late-1990s.10
But is that right? Did the NYPD’s “broken windows” policing really lead the urban
renewal in New York City? Did order-maintenance policing trigger the redevelopment of
Times Square? Did aggressive misdemeanor arrests transform the city’s Skid Rows? Or was
it the other way around? Were the leaders or instigators, instead, high-end commercial and
6

For a general discussion, see James Traub, The Devil’s Playground: A Century of Pleasure and Profit in
Times Square (Random House 2004); James Traub, Common Of Earthly Delights, NY Times, B48 (March 14,
2004).
7
David C. Anderson, Crime Stoppers, NY Times, Section 6 at 47 (Feb 9, 1997).
8
See, e.g., Ana Joanes, Does the New York City Police Department Deserve Credit for the Decline in
New York City’s Homicide Rates? A Cross-city Comparison of Policing Strategies and Homicide Rates, 33
Colum J L & Soc Probs 265, 273 (2000).
9
Consider John E. Eck and Edward R. Maguire, Have Changes in Policing Reduced Violent Crime? An
Assessment of the Evidence, in Alfred Blumstein and Joel Wallman, eds, The Crime Drop in America
(Cambridge 2000); Jeffrey Fagan and Garth Davies, Policing Guns: Order Maintenance and Crime Control in
New York in Bernard E. Harcourt, ed, Guns, Crime, and Punishment in America (NYU 2003); Bernard E.
Harcourt and Jens Ludwig, Broken Windows? New Evidence from New York City and a Five-City Social
Experiment (working paper 2005); Bernard E. Harcourt, Illusion of Order: The False Promise of Broken
Windows Policing (Harvard 2001); Bernard E. Harcourt, Policing Disorder, 27 Boston Rev 16-22 (April/May
2001); Andrew Karmen, New York Murder Mystery: The True Story Behind the Crime Crash of the 1990s
(NYU 2000); George L. Kelling and William H. Sousa, Jr., Do Police Matter? An Analysis of the Impact of
New York City’s Police Reforms, Civic Report No 22, Manhattan Institute Center for Civic Innovation (Dec
2001) available at http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/cr_22.htm (last visited Feb 22, 2005); George L.
Kelling and Catherine Coles, Fixing Broken Windows (NYU 1996); Andrea McArdle and Tanya Erzen, eds,
Zero Tolerance: Quality of Life and the New Police Brutality in New York City (NYU 2001); Eli B.
Silverman, NYPD Battles Crime: Innovative Strategies in Policing (Northeastern 1999); Ralph B. Taylor,
Breaking Away from Broken Windows: Baltimore Neighborhoods and the Nationwide Fight Against Crime,
Guns, Fear, and Decline (Westview 2001).
10
Kelling and Sousa, Do Police Matter at 18 (cited in note 9).
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residential real estate developers? Or the commercial, media, and entertainment enterprises
that captured Times Square? Or the urban planers who, many years earlier in the late 1970s
and 1980s, designated this blighted area for massive development? Could it be the real estate
redevelopment reconfigured crime patterns in New York’s Red Light district, producing the
crime reduction? Was the crime drop a mere byproduct of enhancing or protecting real
estate investments? And if so, how come people moved into these disorderly urban areas
when they were still in such a condition of blight, crime, decay, and homelessness? Who
were the urban pioneers who moved in first? Could it be that they had a taste for disorder
and deviance?
It is, naturally, difficult to disentangle the chronological and causal arrows between
crime and real estate. The two are so intimately related. The story of Times Square, for
instance, fits within a larger historical narrative concerning the ebb and flow of real estate
values—a story that runs through “white flight” in the 1960s and 1970s, inner-city urban
decay in the 1970s and 1980s, and a gradual return of young professionals to the inner core
as well as gentrification of the lower-Manhattan, Downtown and warehouse districts.11 This
account has important political economic dimensions, including the loss of manufacturing
jobs, factories, and light industry in the city resulting in a healthy supply of large,
convertible, loft spaces.
In this larger story, crime and real estate values are inextricably linked. Wesley
Skogan’s research on police beat meetings in Chicago confirms that home-owners, as
compared to renters, are disproportionately interested in crime and policing in their
neighborhood, and as a result are disproportionately represented at local police precinct beat
meetings.12 Similarly, in his research on community policing in Seattle, Steve Herbert found
that a small set of “regulars”—consisting of a hand-full of white, middle-aged property
owners quite unlike their neighbors—dominated community police meetings.13 A recent
study by Amy Schwartz, Scott Susin and Ioan Voicu—Has Falling Crime Driven New York
City’s Real Estate Boom?—demonstrates a link between crime and real estate values in New

11

For a general discussion, see Traub, The Devil’s Playground (cited in note 6).
See Wesley Skogan, On The Beat 175-176 (Westview 1999) (reporting that beat meeting participants
appeared to be fairly affluent with more than 80% owning their homes).
13
See Steve Herbert, The Unbearable Lightness of Community: Police, Urban Residents, and the StateSociety Relation 4 (Oct, 2004) (unpublished manuscript, University of Washington).
12
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York City.14 Though the authors suggest that the media portrayals were a bit exaggerated,
they find that reduced crime in New York City positively affected real estate values.15
Specifically, the authors found that “falling crime rates are responsible for six percentage
points of the overall 17.5 percent increase in property values that New York City
experienced from 1994 to 1998.”16 Other factors that contributed, they find, include
education quality (3.8 percentage points), and subsidized housing investment (3.2
percentage points), with about 4.5 percentage points not well explained by their model.17
The authors conclude that “the popular story touting the overwhelming importance of crime
rates has some truth to it.18 Falling crime rates are responsible for about a third of the post1994 boom in property values.”19
But there is more to the correlation. As Schwartz, Susin and Voicu suggest, “The
story is incomplete.”20 According to their research, the simple narrative—namely, that lower
crime causes increased real estate values—”ignores the revitalization of New York City’s
poorer communities” as well as the important role that “housing subsidies played in
mitigating the earlier bust.”21 The focus on real estate values does not do justice to the
processual dynamics of how a neighborhood is redeveloped, gentrified, or commercialized.
It does not begin to scratch at the dynamic relationship between real estate redevelopment
and crime. There are crucial intervening steps—significant investments by commercial and
residential real estate developers, political initiatives by city planners, and competing efforts
by not-for-profit homeless agencies to secure housing for their clients. The cover may well
be crime and crime reduction. But under that cover, there is a tumultuous battle over real
property, resulting in economic restructuring of these disorderly neighborhoods. In this more
complete story, the most important players are high-end commercial and residential real
estate developers, city urban planners, and non-profit housing advocates for the homeless.
The police and their policing are ancillary.
For purposes of exploring this hypothesis, Los Angeles’s Skid Row offers an ideal
14

Amy Schwartz, Scott Susin, and Ioan Voicu, Has Falling Crime Driven New York City’s Real Estate
Boom?, 14 J Housing Research 101, 131 (2003) available at http://www.fanniemaefoundation.org/programs
/jhr/pdf/jhr_1401_schwartz.pdf (last visited Feb 22, 2005).
15
Id at 102.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Schwartz, Susin and Voicu, 14 J Housing Research at 102 (cited in note 13).
19
Id.
20
Id.
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case study—an ongoing and uncontrolled experiment in an extremely disorderly downtown
area.22 The fact is, still today, L.A.’s Skid Row is unreconstructed. It is described,
accurately, as a “wretched”23 area where thousands of destitute, mentally ill, and drug
dependent human beings sleep on the sidewalks, pitch tents, make shelters and
encampments out of discarded cardboard boxes, urinate and defecate in the street, engage in
open sex, and wander about trolling shopping carts overflowing with all their earthly
possessions. Walking through L.A.’s Skid Row, winding around and between fifty tents and
box-homes on a single side of a single street, in the shadow of the nearby luxurious
Downtown office buildings, is truly a surreal experience in modern America.24 According to
George Kelling, in a deposition in January 2004, the area looks like a “Third World
country.” 25 It has all the markers of what qualifies as “disorder” under the broken-windows
theory—”aggressive panhandling, street prostitution, drunkenness and public drinking,
menacing behavior, harassment, obstruction of streets and public spaces, vandalism and
graffiti, public urination and defecation, unlicensed vending and peddling.”26 A private
security guard for the local Business Improvement District (“BID”), Corporal Michael
Jackson of International Services, Inc. (“ISI”), recounts: “We deal with encampments every
day. . . . I’ve got about 50 encampments all on one street. And at 441 Towne, I have about
50 encampments as a group, from 35 encampments on one side across the street.”27
21

Id.
My initial interest in issues concerning Skid Row in Los Angeles began when I was contacted by
Michael Katz, a partner at the law firm of Morrison & Foerster, in December 2003. Morrison & Foerster
represented several homeless individuals who claimed to have been physically abused by the private security
forces of the Business Improvement District [“BID”] associations in the Skid Row neighborhood, and had filed
suit in the case of Armando Cervantes, et al. v. International Services, Inc., et al, No. BC220226, Sup Ct of
California. Morrison & Foerster asked me whether I would be willing to testify as an expert rebuttal witness to
George L. Kelling, who had been retained as an expert by the defendant BIDs to offer testimony on the brokenwindows theory and the positive externalities of enforcing quality-of-life offenses. I agreed to testify as a
rebuttal witness on the condition that my fee—pegged to George Kelling’s $300 hourly fee—be donated to two
not-for-profit institutions (one a non-profit law center, the other an educational institution, neither of which
work in the area of homelessness or policing). The case settled pre-trial three months later and my involvement
in the case ended. As a result, at my request, I was not compensated in any way by Morrison & Foerster and,
thus, not compensated by Morrison & Foerster for any of this research.
23
Carla Rivera, Midnight Mission Growing Even as Downtown Gentrifies, LA Times B1 (Dec 15, 2003).
24
This is based on personal observation, but for additional verification, see Michael Jackson, Deposition
in Cervantes v International Services, Inc, No BC220226 at 65, Sup Ct of California (June 19, 2002) (“Every
day we deal with encampments. . . I’ve got about 50 encampments all on one street.”). Jackson is a corporal for
ISI (International Services, Inc.), the private security agency for the BID in the area.
25
George L. Kelling, Deposition in Cervantes v International Services, Inc, No BC220226 at 24, Sup Ct of
California (Jan 9, 2004).
26
Kelling and Coles, Fixing Broken Windows at 15 (cited in note 9). The only missing element is
“squeegeeing,” but that does seem to be a distinctively New York thing.
27
Jackson Deposition at 65 (cited in note 24).
22
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According to most observers, LA’s Skid Row has not changed much over the past
decade. It remains, today, in a condition far worse than the worst disorderly neighborhoods
of New York City in the early 1990’s. But the complexion of L.A.’s Skid Row is beginning
to change. A number of high-end renovated loft condominiums and rentals, as well as edgy
hotel spaces, are beginning to appear on L.A.’s Skid Row. And significant luxury loft
development is taking off in adjacent neighborhoods—such as the neighboring Garment
District, in South Park, on Bunker Hill, and in Little Tokyo. In the process, a conflict is
brewing between those high-end loft developers and the non-profit SRO-operators
advocating for the homeless. The key battles taking place now, and I predict in the coming
years—battles that will shape the future of L.A.’s Skid Row—are not between the LAPD
and aggressive panhandlers, but between the loft developers and the non-profit SROoperators.
For its part, the LAPD has engaged for many years in regular sweeps of L.A.’s Skid
Row with no real effect. The larger Los Angeles area, as a whole, experienced remarkable
drops in crime during the 1990s, despite the fact that the LAPD was embroiled in
controversy and wracked with internal discord—from the Rodney King beating in 1991,
through the Rampart scandal in 1998, to the federal consent decree in 2000.28 Somewhat
surprisingly, reported crime decreased significantly in most parts of L.A. and, depending on
the time frame and crime category, LA crime rates witnessed even greater declines than
New York City. Between 1991 and 1998, for example, Los Angeles experienced a slightly
greater drop in its robbery rate (down 60.9 percent) as compared to New York City (down
60.1 percent).29
In the Skid Row and adjacent areas, however, crime has been more elusive: across
most categories of reported UCR Part I crimes,30 the Skid Row area did not experience this
larger wave of decreasing crime.31 In terms of robbery offenses, Skid Row and its vicinity
was the only area of the eighteen police districts in L.A. to experience an increase in crime

28

For an excellent overview of the chronology of the Rampart scandal, see PBS Frontline: Rampart
Scandal Timeline available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/lapd/scandal/cron.html (last
visited Feb 22, 2005).
29
Fox Butterfield, Cities Reduce Crime and Conflict Without New York-Style Hardball, NY Times A11
(Mar 4, 2000) (reporting statistics compiled by Alfred Blumstein).
30
The Uniform Crime Report Part I offenses include murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary,
theft,
motor
vehicle
theft,
and
arson.
See
http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius_03/pdf/03sec1.pdf;
http://sbi2.jus.state.nc.us/crp/public/UCRProgram/text.htm.
31
See infra text at __ and Table 4.
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between 1997 and 2002.32 Yet, despite the sticky crime problem in Downtown Los Angeles,
Skid Row is experiencing high-end real estate development—which suggests, again, that
crime and policing may not be the catalysts of urban renewal.
L.A.’s Skid Row is at the heart of an urban struggle that may reveal how America’s
disorderly urban neighborhoods experience change. It is a battle over land and lofts, and it
covers everything from zoning to public toilets. In this sense, L.A.’s Skid Row affords a
window to observe in slow motion—in real time—how an urban downtown area becomes
gentrified. And in the process, how issues of homelessness intersect with urban renewal. I
emphasize in real time because the changes are occurring as I write, and neither I nor
anyone else knows how L.A.’s Skid Row will ultimately evolve, if at all. In this sense, I
offer a preliminary snapshot in this article—a rich description of the present condition of
L.A.’s Skid Row.
But I also highlight one salient fact, a fact somewhat buried in the debris and
disorder of L.A.’s Skid Row, a curious artifact that may significantly influence the trajectory
of the Row over the next decade. Somewhat surprisingly, amidst the rancor and acrimony in
the battle between developers and homeless advocates, there is an odd and uncomfortable, a
dark, perhaps even sardonic alignment of interests that may ultimately ease or facilitate the
transition to gentrification of Skid Row. The advocates for the homeless and the non-profit
SRO-operators, naturally, want to buy as much real estate on the Row as possible in order to
increase the housing stock for low-income tenants and to maintain Skid Row as Skid Row.
Oddly, the high-end real estate developers may share this desire to retain the Skid Row
flavor. For it is precisely that Skid Row flavor that gives the neighborhood its edginess, that
makes it feel like Manhattan—at least, like the old, 1970s, edgy, lower-Manhattan that
attracted urban pioneers in the early days of Soho and TriBeCa, of the Lower East Side and
the East Village. It is precisely that juxtaposition of high-end lofts and homeless beggars that
gives L.A.’s Skid Row a trendy, urban, edgy, noir flavor that is so marketable. To be sure, if
the developers succeed in gentrifying parts of Skid Row, at some point the neighborhood
will go upscale mainstream, as most of those formerly-edgy neighborhoods did in New York
City, especially Soho and TriBeCa. But the point is, right now, the two opposing forces—
the real estate developers and the homeless advocates—may not be entirely in head-to-head
conflict. The developers are potentially more accommodating of the homeless than the
32

See infra text at __ and Table 5.
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homeless advocates are of the developers. And that may end up promoting or easing the
gentrification. What will happen in the next decade, though, is unpredictable.
In this article, I document the present. I make a record, with photographs, interviews,
maps, and observations of L.A.’s Skid Row as it is today. Drawing on the tradition and
methods of critical socio-legal studies,33 I also explore the constitutive dimensions of
deviance. I investigate the possible attraction that disorderliness and criminality may have to
today’s urban pioneers. I explore the idea that deviance and disorder may become, in some
corners, a consumable good to urban dwellers. And I do this by drawing on numerous hours
of personal observation on the streets of L.A.’s Skid Row, on interviews of service
providers, homeless persons, city officials, homeless advocates, real estate developers, and
others connected to the situation on L.A.’s Skid Row, on media accounts, and on published
data about crime and real estate in the area.
I explore what it is like to be on Skid Row—on the streets and in the lofts—to
advocate for the homeless, as well as to redevelop the neighborhood. I listen carefully and
reproduce here the voices of the chief protagonists in the real estate battles. I try to see Skid
Row through their eyes, hearts, and minds, and to let them speak directly to you, the reader.
I present them, warts and all. I also pour over crime, public health, urban planning, and real
estate statistics. And I draw as well on a rich set of materials, documents, and reports
produced in litigation over the private policing of Skid Row, including numerous
depositions of police officers, private security guards, service providers, local merchants and
property owners, experts, and other persons associated with L.A.’s Skid Row.
My project, very simply, is to unveil the deeper conflicts brewing under the surface
of L.A.’s disorderly Skid Row, to explore the intriguing attraction to disorderliness, and to
turn crime and deviance on its head. Downtown L.A. presents fertile ground to observe,
document, probe, and analyze the transformation of a disorderly neighborhood. I represent
in this article the “before,” and let others gesture to an “after.”

I.

Walking the Streets of L.A.’s Skid Row
Alice Callahan is an old-time grassroots community organizer. A former nun,

Callahan has been fighting full-time for the rights of the homeless on L.A.’s Skid Row since
33

See A Conversation between Calvin Morrill, John Hagan, Bernard Harcourt and Tracey Meares, The
University of Chicago Legal Forum, Volume 2005.
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the early 1980s—and part-time before that. Her base of operations: Las Familias, a day-care
facility located on Skid Row that serves the children of immigrant sweat-shops workers in
the nearby Garment District. Alice Callahan is the founder and now a board member of the
Skid Row Housing Trust, a not-for-profit housing organization that owns and operates a
number of “hotels” on the Row—or what are more properly called single-room occupancy
(“SRO”) rental apartment buildings.
On a sharp, sunny day, temperatures in the mid-70s, Thursday, January 22, 2004,
Alice guides me through Skid Row, pointing out the landmarks.34 She draws my attention to
her favorite hotels—those she helped renovate and refurbish for the poor. Alice is proud of
her hotels, she tells me, they are clean, they are well-kept, they smell good, they look
gentrified. “We fix up these buildings,” Alice tells me. “The nicest parts of the Row are the
buildings we fixed up. We planted trees. We stopped the [drug] activity from running in and
out. It used to be when you had bad neighbors like this, you would just tear the buildings
down. But all that did was exacerbate the homeless problem. So we are actually trying to
solve the problem,” Alice asserts.35
We stop at the Produce Hotel on Seventh and Central—at the southeastern corner of
Skid Row—owned and operated by Callahan’s Skid Row Housing Trust (“the Trust”). Mike
Alvidrez, the manager of all the Trust hotels, shows me around.36 The building is a long, two
story building surrounded by palm trees. It looks like a motel, but without the doors on the
outside. Inside, there are 95 units of housing. Mike walks me through the laundry room and
hallways. They are all very clean and newly painted. They smell of detergent. Mike takes
me into Room 101, a vacant room. It’s about eight-by-ten feet. It reminds me of a dorm
room. Modern. Simple. There’s a bed, a desk, a chair, a standing armoire—all in light wood,
perhaps compound. The walls are white. The light streams in the window. There’s not much
to see, really. The bathroom is separate, down the hall. It’s communal. A co-ed, one-user
bathroom, with a shower and toilet. It, too, smells like cleaning product. Other than that, we
walk through kitchens and communal areas, and back out to the palm trees.
Room 101 at the Produce Hotel rents out on a monthly basis for $56. That’s the rate
if you are on general relief—which comes up to about $223 per month. To get general relief,
34
35

Interview with Alice Callahan, in Los Angeles (Sept 11, 2004) (cited in note 2).
Id.
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you have to work forty hours per month doing community service, unless you have a valid
excuse. You can stay on general relief for nine months out of twelve. The rest of the time,
you have to find another source of income. Some of the units are market rate—$298 per
month. That’s for people, for example, on Social Security disability.37 Like Alice, Mike
Alvidrez is proud of his hotel. It is clean, safe, and honest. There are no bad smells—so
common in homeless missions and housing. No trash or litter. It is inviting. And that’s what
Alice wants: “What I want is for people to drive through Skid Row and see an area that
looks gentrified, but is for the poor,” she tells the L.A. Business Journal.38
Alice explains to me:
Housing is the major issue on the Row, as opposed to the homeless. [Skid
Row] is an endangered low income housing community. There is nobody in this
city, or probably any city anywhere in the United States, who builds housing for
a single adult whose total income is a general relief check for $223. Nobody
builds housing for those people. So it’s not that it’s wonderful to keep everybody
here on the Row. But nobody is building housing for them elsewhere. And it’s not
just the housing unit, but also having the services you need to make it possible to
get by on $223 a month. Remember, once you have used up your unemployment,
the next income available is $223. So where would any of us go to live with
$223?
When you think about it in the abstract, all Skid Row is, is the last place in
the community that a person goes if you do not have family and you do not have
money. That’s where you find pretty cheap housing, free food, and free clothing.
That is all that Skid Row is, wherever it is. So saving this housing is critical.
All I can do is save the existing housing for the people who are there now.
Saving housing, creating nice housing for people, that doesn’t solve the drug
problem, that doesn’t solve the crime problem, doesn’t solve the unemployment
problem, but until people are living in places of dignity with safe, clean housing,
they can’t even begin to work on those other problems.39
The Skid Row Housing Trust now owns and operates about nineteen hotels, and they
are all substantially similar. The Trust started operating in around 1988 when Alice Callahan
successfully lobbied City Hall to stop owners from demolishing their SRO’s and enlisted the
Los Angeles Community Redevelopment Agency (“CRA”) to fund, along with other public
sources, the purchase and renovations of the SRO’s into low-income housing units.40
36

Michael Alvidrez is the director of the management company that forms part of the Skid Row Housing
Trust. See Alice Callahan, Deposition in Cervantes v International Services, Inc, No BC220226 at 126, Sup Ct
of California (Nov 18, 2003).
37
Interview with Michael Alvidrez, Skid Row Housing Trust, in Los Angeles (Jan 22, 2004).
38
John Brinsley, Aiding Immigrants on Skid Row is Calling of Activist, LA Bus J (Jul 19, 1999).
39
Interview with Alice Callahan (Sept 11, 2004)(cited in note 2).
40
Brinsley, Aiding Immigrants on Skid Row is Calling of Activist (cited in note 41).
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Callahan founded the Trust at the time, and it purchased deteriorating SRO’s and renovated
and converted them into subsidized low-income housing units. By 1999, the Trust had about
fifteen hotels and managed real estate valued at about $88 million.41 In late January 2004, at
the time of my first observations, the Trust owned and managed about nineteen hotels for a
total of about 1,100 low-income housing units on Skid Row.42 Another not-for-profit
agency, SRO Inc., owns and operates another twenty hotels.
All in all, there are approximately sixty-five SRO hotels on Skid Row, owned and
operated by an assortment of different organizations. About forty-five hotels, or almost 70
percent of the units, are run by not-for-profits—including the Trust, SRO Inc., and a few
other non-profit organizations that have about three or four hotels. The rest are owned and
operated by for-profit owners. These private hotels are congregated mostly on Main Street.
Large, tall buildings, they make up about one third of the housing on Skid Row.43 Most of
the smaller non-profit SRO’s are distributed evenly throughout Skid Row, and form a solid
web of low-income housing.
The area is also home to many service providers, including homeless missions,
treatment programs, and service centers. There’s the Weingart Center, the Salvation Army,
the Union Rescue Mission, the Los Angeles Mission, Midnight Mission, the Catholic
Workers’ Hospitality Kitchen—better known as the “Hippie Kitchen”—the Downtown
Drop-In Center, and many other services. Tom Gilmore, a real estate developer, calls this
“the only city-designated homeless service provider area in the nation. . . . [The City
specifically put all the services here] with the notion that centralizing homeless services
would somehow provide a more efficient system. . . .”44 Between the SRO’s and the
homeless services, the area is a densely-woven fabric of low-income housing and service
providers. This is reflected in the following map of Skid Row, coded in black for SRO’s and
grey for service providers for the poor and homeless.
* * * Insert Map.Skid.Row.Hotels.jpg here * * *
“Skid Row” refers specifically to this ten-by-five block area to the East of the
downtown sky-scrapers, an area bordered by Main Street to the West, Seventh Street to the
41

Id.
Callahan Deposition (cited in note 32); Danny King, City Center ruling stalls affordable plan, LA Bus J
3(Jul 14, 2003).
43
Interview with Alice Callahan (Sept 11, 2004)(cited in note 2).
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South, Alameda Street to the East, and Third Street to the North.45 The term “Skid Row,”
though, is highly contested today.46 Alice continues to use the street name--”Skid Row”—
with a vengeance, but recognizes that “Everybody is trying to change the perception. I mean
the battle between what you call it. We keep saying ‘Skid Row.’ They keep saying ‘Central
City East.’ And then you got all of these other silliness, the ‘Toy District.’ You know
everybody is naming things. It’s all about real estate and perception. If they can just change
the perception. . . .”47
Alice guides me next to the Salvation Army on Fifth Street, a large imposing
structure. The center offers a number of programs from alcohol and drug detox to reentry for
men—across the street are programs for women.48 “Do you see the sprinklers?” Alice asks
me. “What sprinklers?” I respond. “Look up, about eight feet. Those sprinkler heads. Right
there. Do you see them?” The Salvation Army has installed sprinklers on the side of its
building to clean the streets, with the curious result, of course, that the homeless no longer
sleep on that sidewalk. The sprinklers go off at random times during the night.49 Alice
warns me not to be duped by the missions and service providers. “The missions have to be
seen not as Mother Theresas,” Alice emphasizes, “but as major multinational
corporations.”50 She feels the same way about many of the providers:
There’s a Salvation Army over on 5th Street which runs a detox program,
people come from all over the county to that. They have sprinklers on the
building, so if the homeless dare to sleep outside their building, they will sprinkle
them. When the portable toilet was put out for the homeless, they objected and
had it moved from their building. That’s the Salvation Army.
44

Interview with Tom Gilmore (Sept 10, 2004) (cited in note 3).
Id at 1.
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The term “Skid Row” apparently “comes from 19th-century logging jargon. Skid Road was the track
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Reality at Street Level: Training Immigrants as Garment Workers, Nat’l Catholic Reporter at 12 (cited in note
49).
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Interview with Alice Callahan (Sept 11, 2004) (cited in note 2).
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See Conrad Watson, Deposition in Cervantes v International Servies, Inc, No. BC220226 at 19–21, Sup
Ct of California (Nov 4, 2003).
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Apparently the sprinklers have been around for a while now. Mike Davis, author of City of Quartz—
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We have Union Rescue Mission, which built its multimillion dollar program,
and they have these big rooms. . . with about 300 people, you go through a
showering process, sort of like a George Orwellian kind of places back in
London, in England. . . .
No agency on the Row has gone from being a small, street level, work-withthe-people kind of place to being the same kind of place when they’re big. . . .
Now we have these huge missions, huge multinational corporations, even the
smaller non-profits are all big multimillion dollar businesses now. . . . They don’t
have a sense of the neighborhood, they haven’t been here that long – now they’re
just hiring directors. Directors come and go. They come for a couple years, they
move on to something else. . . . They don’t even know what’s going on. They
don’t understand the issues.51
We pass next by the Weingart Center, at the corner of San Pedro and 6th Street. The
windows appear almost boarded up, the building is not inviting, but there are many destitute
people waiting outside for treatment and programs. I next visit the Downtown Drop-In
Center on San Julian Street. Operated by the Volunteers of America, the center offers
showers, cots, laundry services, and classes for the homeless. I also explore the “Hippie
Kitchen” run by the Catholic Workers—a group of about eight men and women who live
off-site in a house together where they get room and board free and maybe about $5.00 a
week. Catherine Morris tells me about their programs—the lunches they serve at the Hippie
Kitchen, the meals they serve on the streets and at the AIDS clinic at the County Hospital,
the medical programs they offer, the dentist check-ups, the needle exchange program, and
the Mobile Eye Clinic.52 Equally important are the carts they give out to the homeless, retrofitted with pressed plastic that says “Los Angeles Catholic Worker” and armed with a sign:
“These carts belong to LA Catholic Worker and are available for use by any homeless
person.” The idea is to try to prevent the Business Improvement District (“BID”) security
from confiscating the property of the homeless—an ongoing, pitched battle and the source
of much litigation.53
Then off to the missions, large and small. First, the Union Rescue Mission. I walk
into the men’s side of the mission, through the large waiting room—partially filled by
homeless men waiting for what, I am not sure—and into the hallways. The smell is
overpowering—a rancid odor that feels like it is going to stick to my clothes. I try not to
51

Id.
Interview with Catherine Morris, in Los Angeles (Jan 22, 2004).
53
The confiscation issue was at the heart of the Cervantes litigation. See Third Amended Complaint for
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Damages in Cervantes v International Services, Inc, No BC220226 at
¶123, Sup Ct of California.
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breath, to make it out of there without inhaling. Out, finally, and past another mission, this
one much smaller. The chaplain is at the door, welcoming passers-by. He invites me in. He’s
proud of his mission—of the prayer room that serves as a waiting area, and the little makeshift chapel. There are lots of religious posters and signs on the walls—12-step program
aphorisms, religious proverbs, a shepherd intended to comfort. All the activities here revolve
around salvation.
As I walk through Skid Row, I notice the “bum-proof” bus stops. These are, as Mike
Davis explains, the “Rapid Transit District’s new barrel-shaped bus bench, which offers a
minimal surface for uncomfortable sitting while making sleeping impossible.”54 At the
corner, stand three portable toilets. Apparently, the placement of the portable toilets was an
eight-year saga. Former mayor Richard Riordan allocated twenty-six port-a-johns to Skid
Row, but he insisted that they be lined up side-by-side. Alice Callahan disagreed, believing
that it would be better to have them scattered throughout the Row. So each night, Callahan
and others from the Catholic Workers would uproot the portable toilets and distribute them
around the neighborhood. Each morning, the street sanitation department would put them
back in a line. This went on for a long time, until the city finally gave in and allowed them
to be distributed throughout Skid Row.55 Alice explains this all to me, and then, with a
sparkle in her eye and a sly smile, complains that the three portable toilets are too
congregated.
I walk down another block and notice the BID private security forces. They wear red
shirts, and, not surprisingly, are known in the neighborhood as the “Red Shirts.” The color
of their shirt tells them apart from private security in adjacent areas—and, at the same time,
tells you what neighborhood you are in. The “Red Shirts” patrol Skid Row. The “Purple
Shirts” patrol the Downtown Central Business district and the Historic Core area. And the
“Yellow Shirts” patrol the Garment District, which is south of Seventh Street.56
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Davis, 39 UCLA L Rev at 331 (cited in note X).
See Arthur Jones, Complex Reality at Street Level: Training Immigrants as Garment Workers, Natl
Catholic Reporter at 12 (Oct 12, 2001) available at http://natcath.org/NCR_Online/archives2/2001d
/101201/101201h.htm (last visited Feb 22, 2005).
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See Daniel Wayne Campbell, Deposition in Cervantes v International Servies, Inc, No. BC220226 at 36,
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The Red Shirts are equipped with batons and spray and handcuffs.57 Some carry
guns. The BIDs want the supervisors to carry guns at night for safety.58 Some of the Red
Shirts are on bicycles, others travel by foot, and still others work in patrol vehicles.59
I watch two Red Shirts on bikes as they follow—hovering closely—a homeless man
transporting five carts of his property, mumbling to himself, swearing at them. He’s taking
all his property somewhere down the next street, one cart at a time, sweating profusely,
talking loudly. I offer a greeting, and I get a rambling, offended—and offensive—tirade
about the Red Shirts and carts and property and life and homelessness. The homeless man
has no time for me. He has to move his five carts, serially. And the Red Shirts watch, like
me, they making sure he keeps on moving, and doesn’t stop to encamp.60
As late afternoon rolls around, the conditions on Skid Row seem to deteriorate. More
and more boxes, tents, and encampments pop up on the side of buildings. It’s about 5:00
p.m. now. It’s starting to get dark. I walk down San Julian, what some call the “epicenter” of
Skid Row. There are congregations of destitute men, mostly African-American, sitting,
lying, crouching, or standing along the sides of the streets. Some come toward me offering
to sell drugs. Others, uncomfortable at my gaze, shuffle around, seeming to hide things.
People are building their encampments for the night. Boxes, tents, tarps, rope, blankets—it
is getting very busy. One encampment sets up next to the other. The Row is getting ready for
another night.
The conditions on Skid Row are, as the L.A. Times tells us, “wretched.”61 San Pedro
57

Observations of January 22, 2004. See also Michael Jackson, Deposition in Cervantes v International
Servies, Inc, No. BC220226 at 16, Sup Ct of California (June 19, 2002). Jackson, a corporal for International
Services, Inc. (“ISI”) states that he carries baton and handcuffs. Id at 16.
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Tracey Lovejoy, Deposition in Cervantes v International Servies, Inc, No. BC220226 at 34-35, Sup Ct
of California (May 20, 2002).
59
See Campbell Deposition at 17 (cited in note 50) (describing the “Red Shirts” as “broken down [into]
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They have a new multi-purpose storage space that they created to deal with the homeless encampments in the
area. They offer bins—large green garbage bins—for homeless people to use to marshall their property. In the
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Rivera, Midnight Mission Growing Even as Downtown Gentrifies, LA Times at B1 (cited in note 23).

Bernard E. Harcourt

Policing L.A.’s Skid Row

17

Street cuts through the core of the Row. On the street, the Business Journal reports, “Dozens
of men and a few women loiter along the sidewalks. A few lonely souls are sprawled across
the pavement or curled up in doorways. Several sit on milk crates, in small groups or alone.
Some stare blankly ahead. Others raise their voices in animated conversations with their
buddies or with the voices inside their heads.”62 As the L.A. Times reports, “Come nightfall,
rows of makeshift cardboard shelters line the sidewalks on 6th, San Julian and San Pedro
streets.”63 On occasion, the homeless urinate and defecate in public view on the sidewalk.64
During the day, they transport their worldly possessions in multiple shopping carts on the
streets.65
The L.A. Times did a photo spread a few weeks before my arrival, on December 16,
2003. The Weingart Center also has a few pictures of the Row on its website.66 These
pictures accurately reflect what the Row looks like. The wall-to-wall encampments, the rows
of homeless and destitute, the ill. “A woman in ragged clothes, pus and blood running from
a burn on her leg, was lying on the sidewalk, mumbling incoherently.”67 A destitute man in
wheelchair, his head locked back, mouth gaping open, drooling, wheezing, with bloated
ankles and fleshy, pussing wounds on the side of his legs. L.A.’s Skid Row is truly a
shocking sight.
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I drive through Skid Row later that evening. The streets are full, with easily forty or
more encampments on the side of a single street. I drive again down the Row the next
evening, January 23, 2004, and the streets are again lined with homeless people sleeping in
tents, cardboard boxes, under tarps and between grocery carts. I return and make similar
observations on the nights of September 9th, 10th, and 11th, 2004. The streets are just as
full.
In the late evening of September 10, 2004, just before midnight, I walk through Skid
Row with Tom Gilmore, the real estate developer, and Fabian Núñez, the speaker of the
California assembly. Núñez, a resident of Gilmore’s loft building nearby, joins us by
coincidence. Again the streets are full, and drug crime is rampant and readily apparent. Here
is a portion of the audio tape from that walk, just past midnight, the early morning of
September 11, 2004:
Núñez:

That young girl’s got to be nineteen. . . .

Gilmore:

Nineteen.

Harcourt:

Where?

Núñez:

In that pile of boxes over there. Making sure nobody. . .

Anonymous: How you gentlemen doing? Are you guys lost, bros?
Gilmore:

No, no. (Laughs) We know where we’re going. We’re about as
lost as you. . .

Anonymous: You know that’s right. (Laughter)
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Gilmore:

Have a good night. That’s the Union Rescue Mission right here. . . .
[They put up about] 1,200 a night. Different people. They have
programs. . .

Harcourt:

So, this is Winston and what?

Gilmore:

Winston and Wall. . .

Harcourt:

Who are those two guys in front of us?

Gilmore:

Buying, probably. Nice crack pipe there. This is one of the
only places around that the dealers drive to the users, as
opposed to the other way around. Most places, if you are a
user, you drive and you find your dealer and they make a sale.
Here, dealers come in. Everybody comes to the dealer. They
buy. The dealer drives out.

Harcourt:

Now, we are basically surrounded here by people who are
sleeping on the street.

Gilmore:

Yep.

Núñez:

Yep.

Gilmore:

People who look like. . . they’re at bottom tonight. . . .

Harcourt:

That guy is buying, right? I mean, right there, right there.

Gilmore:

Yeah. Yeah.

Harcourt:

I mean, he just. . .

Gilmore:

[muffled] This is dangerous. Get over here. Get close. Get over here.
[muffled]
[muffled conversation]

Gilmore:

You don’t want to get caught in the middle of them. That’s all.68

These observations of the Row are by no means unique. Bill Boyarsky, who teaches
political science at the University of Southern California, recounts walking on San Julian up
Fifth Street: “Crack was being sold in front of the Los Angeles Mission, kitty-corner from
the Central Division police station. Dealers offered us heroin as we headed toward Main and
Spring Street.”69 Donald Kanner, the owner of City Seafoods at 531 Towne Avenue—on the
Row—describes how at “12 o’clock at night it looks like the 4th of July there are so many
people, all you can see is their pipes lit up.”70 Joe Greco, the manager of a wholesale
distributor on Skid Row, describes having eighty homeless people living behind his
68
69
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Boyarsky, Homeless; A Cause Liberal L.A. Runs From, LA Times at M3 (cited in note 62).
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building, some carrying a mattress to have sex.71
George Kelling describes Skid Row succinctly: “to put it in the broadest terms, it
looked like a Third World country and I was stunned when I first saw it.”72 Kelling first
toured the area with the new police commissioner, William Bratton, and the mayor, James
Hahn, and was particularly struck by the open sexual activity, homeless encampments, trash
and litter, including condoms, needles and syringes, the drug dealing, drug use, and apparent
blocking of sidewalks. According to Kelling, Skid Row is to Los Angeles today what the
subways and Grand Central Station were to New York in the late 1980s.73 “It is,” Kelling
explains, “a terribly littered area ranging from drug paraphernalia to abandoned food and
plates and garbage. Again, . . . I was struck by it looking like a Third World country [in
terms of the] level of disorderly conditions and disorderly behavior and the extensity.”74
There is, on Skid Row, according to the business leaders, “a pervasive sense of
lawlessness” that manifests itself through “open sexual activities, trash, abandoned and
unattended property, blocking the sidewalks, blocking access to commercial establishments,
the inability to open gates because people were up against them, the frightening array of
shoppers and users of the area.”75 There is also a significant amount of “physical disorder”
as defined by the “broken windows” theory. A recent city redevelopment plan offers an
interesting overview of the blighted conditions in the area.76 The following statistics give an
idea of Skid Row, though they cover a larger area that only captures the western half of the
Row. According to the CRA, 539 of the 1,483 buildings (or 36 percent) are deteriorating
structures that are either in dilapidated condition or require extensive to moderate
rehabilitation; 1,273 of the 2,148 parcels in the area (or 59 percent) exhibit characteristics of
physical blight and are classified as either deteriorated or deferred maintenance.77
Estimates of the number of homeless on the streets of Skid Row on any night vary
considerably, but range in the several thousands—an astoundingly large number for a fifty70
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square-block area.78 According to the Los Angeles Economic Roundtable, homeless persons
in the county of Los Angeles make up a greater proportion of the overall population (0.30
percent) than for the United States in general (0.23 percent).79 On a typical night in Los
Angeles County, the Roundtable estimates that more than 78,000 persons are homeless.80
Approximately 84 percent of those homeless--or 65,000 people--are in the central city
area.81 The fifty-square-block Skid Row area, it is estimated, is home to approximately
8,000 of those displaced persons.82 The L.A. Times puts the number at about 5,000 people
living on the streets of L.A.’s Skid Row: “In Los Angeles pup tents, blankets and cardboard
boxes pack downtown sidewalks after dark. As many as 5,000 people live on the 50 square
blocks that are just minutes from City Hall.”83 According to other reports, the fifty-squareblock area has about 11,000 inhabitants, of which about 7,000 live in the sixty-five or so
SRO hotels. That’s where Alice Callahan puts her estimate, and it leaves about 4,000 people
living on the street.84 As such, Los Angeles probably has the largest Skid Row in the
country.85
Many on Skid Row are addicted to drugs. This is clear just from walking the
streets—day or night. Larry Adamson, the president of Midnight Mission, estimates that
about 80 percent of the homeless in the area are addicted to drugs or alcohol: “About 80
percent of the people who come here have several kinds of drug and alcohol problems.
(And) mental illness and drug abuse often overlap with each other.”86 Crack was the
preferred drug in 1999, because it was the least expensive. According to Captain Stuart
Maislin, then LAPD area commander for the Central Community police station on Skid
Row, “Most of it on Skid Row is crack, some of it is heroin.”87 And the line between the
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homeless on the street and those living in the SRO’s, Alice Callahan explains, is a fine one.
“They are often the same person,” Alice states.
The difference between them might be that a room is available or not
available. . . . So the sidewalks are full of all kinds of guys. Full of guys who
cannot get in [the SRO] because the housing has a waiting list. . . . They have no
where to go. You’ll have guys who could not care less about anything cause they
are just too drugged out and can’t get themselves together to go into a room. You
have guys on the Row who are mentally ill and can’t get themselves together to
go into a room. You have guys who are dealing, like one of the guys here in the
wheelchair, but he’s also dying of diabetes and won’t take care of himself…. He
just doesn’t have it in himself to get himself together to do anything about his life
at this point. So it’s a combination of the guys you have out here… The same kind
of people you are going to find in the hotels are the same people you will find
outside.88
One consequence, research indicates, is that the Central City area suffers from higher
mortality rates due to AIDS, suicide, homicide, and cirrhosis of the liver as compared to the
county as a whole, and that there are higher reported rates for practically all infectious
diseases.89 “Compared to Los Angeles County as a whole, AIDS in the Central Health
District is 2.9 times higher, hepatitis B is 2.4 times higher, syphilis is 3.5 times higher, and
tuberculosis is 3.4 times higher.”90 The rate of drug related deaths in the Central City is
about 10 percent higher than the county as a whole—and medical providers estimate that
“80 percent of their patients have substance abuse disorders or other health problems
exacerbated by substance abuse.”91

II.

Spacious Skid Row Lofts for Sale or Rent
At the corner of Main and 4th Street, spitting distance from the larger privately-

owned SROs, stands the newly-renovated San Fernando Building. It’s a beautiful eight-story
turn-of-the-century building that has been refurbished with spacious loft apartments, 70
units in all including the penthouse. The façade is ornately decorated with painted friezes
and molded cornices. The sunlit expansive lofts have high ceilings and a modern exposed88
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pipe look, original detail, and new ceramic. The renovated 1906 lobby bears a 22 foot
ceiling and an elegant tile floor.92
On the ground floor, signaling the building’s trendy style, is Pete’s Café, an
American-style eatery with tables on the sidewalk and a fancy bar on the inside. The outside
patio sports elegant, Parisian-looking chairs, a red modern awning, and a well-trimmed row
of potted plants. A Dean & Deluca-looking grocery store sits off to the side with fresh fruit
in baskets facing the street. A private guard wearing a loud neon “security” jacket stands at
the ready in front of the lofts.
Tom Gilmore is the real estate developer behind all this. He is, in the words of the
Los Angeles Magazine, the “much-talked-about developer.”93 And, in all likelihood, he is
the person most highly invested in gentrifying the core Skid Row area. Tom Gilmore is
described as “among a new wave of developers buying up architectural dinosaurs
throughout the city core, intent on transforming it into a thriving urban center, complete with
hot boutiques, cool nightclubs and young, creative professionals who want nothing to do
with the suburban landscape of Southern California.”94
Tom sees himself a little differently, as an urban pioneer. On a late Friday night,
September 10, 2004, sitting at the outside patio of Pete’s Café, Tom tells me: “Urban
pioneers are a different kind of animal. They really are. They accept the state it is in, with
the knowledge that that will change. . . . You have to be an urban animal [to appreciate this
aesthetic]. . . There is a raw beauty to even this. . . . Winston and Wall. That will turn into
something someday. I look at cities like impressionist painters look at landscapes. It all gets
a little fuzzy and then I can see what I need to see.”95
Pete’s Café is a happening place. The clientele is young, urban, edgy. They’re
wearing lots of black. Young professionals, mingling, networking, moving from table to
table. And Tom seems to know everyone—or at least, he seems to be known by everyone.
People stop by to say hello, chat, shake his hand, show off their dog, tell a joke. It’s almost
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midnight. As I sit on the street patio interviewing him, tape recorder in hand, a young man
buts into the conversation. It’s Fabian Núñez, speaker of the California Assembly. “37 years
old,” Fabian Núñez tells me. “I’m the first person in the history of California to become
speaker after their first year of being elected,” he explains.96 Fabian Núñez lives in one of
Tom Gilmore’s loft buildings on Skid Row. Fabian seems enamored by Tom. He calls him
“the renaissance man.”97 Referring to the private SRO owners and what he refers to as the
“28-day shuffle”—the practice of kicking renters out of the private SRO apartments after 28
days to avoid any rights attaching— Fabian Núñez is careful to distinguish, and protect his
friend: “Tom could have done that, probably made a lot more money than [he’s] making it
now.”98 The feelings are mutual. “He’s the second most powerful man,” Tom whispers to
me, out of Fabian’s earshot. “He’s unbelievable. He’s key to the future of certainly Los
Angeles and maybe California. He’s a really great guy.”99
Tom has a good working relationship with people in power, including the former
mayor, Richard Riordan, who put him on the city’s homeless services authority. He is, Tom
tells me, a different kind of real estate developer, a developer who is trying to address the
homelessness issues. He explains:
Today I’m in probably one of the weirder positions of any developer in
America in that before I became a developer I was a commissioner for the Los
Angeles Homeless Services Authority, the joint city county authority that handles
all the services for homeless providers throughout the county of LA. I just
resigned this past month after 6 years from the housing authority commission. So
I come from a weird place which is that I’m actually interested in the issue of
homelessness apart from my interest in development and now they coincide.
Clearly there’s been a place where they intersect. But I’ve really had a good
worms-eye view of one of the most dysfunctional social environments in America,
and I’ve also been in the forefront, oddly enough, of the development that now
brings it to the fore in the conversations that Los Angeles is having now about
homelessness, and development identification and the interaction.
. . . I asked the mayor, then mayor Riordan, to be on the homeless service
authority because I knew that there was an opening in it and I’ve always had a
pretty active social conscience. As soon as I came Downtown, it became
apparent pretty quickly that it is the huge festering soar in L.A. and amazingly
enough the city has been able to ignore it for a long, long time. But I didn’t see it
as something that can be ignored and so I wanted to get involved with it. That
and my whole development thing really were very independent at the time,
96

Interview with Tom Gilmore (Sept 10, 2004).
Id.
98
Id.
99
Id.
97

Bernard E. Harcourt

Policing L.A.’s Skid Row

27

because I hadn’t begun doing any residential development at all.
I don’t believe it’s solvable like a chronic illness is solvable ultimately. But I
do think its something that we need to have an impact on. It’s something that
should be dealt with, treated, addressed without the notion that you can
necessarily solve it. Certainly you have to deal with it head on.100
And Tom Gilmore embraces that challenge—the challenge of addressing the tough
questions, of dealing with the hard issues—with gusto and enthusiasm. On our midnight
walk through Skid Row, Tom tells me: “for me, I welcome [the challenge], oddly, in a weird
way. Cause it’s sort of like, people say, ‘Oh, there’s no great challenges anymore.’ Oh
really? (Laughing) Oh really? There are no great challenges anymore? (Laughing) Heh?”101
I chalk it to him being originally from New York City. No, he interrupts. “Irish.”102
Tom Gilmore has now redeveloped the San Fernando Building at the corner of 4th
and Main. This is the first major high-end loft space to be opened in the area, and the first to
give the Row a new flavor of black-clothed, edgy, urban professionals. The media reports:
“‘This is really a city,’ beamed developer Tom Gilmore to the several hundred downtownbased professionals, residents and local politicians gathered to celebrate the opening . . . of
the San Fernando Building” in early August 2000.103
Tom is also renovating and leasing lofts across the street in what he calls the “Old
Bank District.” Gilmore bought the entire block of office buildings bordered by 4th, Main,
5th and Spring Streets and is tuning it into apartments.104 The Los Angeles County
Economic Development Corporation—whose mission is to “attract, retain and grow
businesses and jobs in the regions of LA County, as well as to identify trends and effect
positive change for the local economy”105—refers to the “Old Bank District” residential
development as the “poster child” for the new “conversion of older office buildings into
‘loft’ style units, thanks to the City’s Adaptive Reuse Ordinance.”106
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Tom is also a partner in the renovation of the El Dorado—along with Cedd Moses
and Marc Smith, “two veterans of L.A.’s nightlife scene.”107 The plan there is, for $25
million, to “turn the dusty, forgotten 1914 El Dorado into a chic hotel and restaurant
complex in one of the most rundown parts of downtown.”108 According to reports in the Los
Angeles Magazine, “The El Dorado provided the opportunity for Gilmore, Smith and Moses
to join forces. The trio will not only turn it into a bar and hotel complex, they will break
through walls to Gilmore’s other buildings on the block so that the spacious two-story entry
hall and grand staircase will share ground-floor space with a row of bars and restaurants
fronting the street.”109
Tom emphasizes to me that he is not taking any housing away from the poor. He is
adamant about that: “The problem with Alice Callahan,” Tom tells me, “is that she’s not
interested in the reality anymore. . . . These are empty buildings. We have never taken one
person out of one building ever in our lives, and yet we are constantly portrayed as
gentrifiers, and somehow we are tossing out homeless. . . . Never in our lives.”110

I argue with Tom:
Bernard Harcourt: But, I take it that [Alice Callahan] would say, it’s not that
you are taking someone out of their apartment, it’s that by increasing property
values you make it impossible for. . .
Tom Gilmore: . . . It’s absurd for her to make that case because . . . it means
that every empty building should remain empty forever? That, frozen in time, we
shall all remain. The key is that, when these buildings change, as they do, and we
are part of that change, how do you do it? Do you do it in a responsible way?
You know, does she recognize the fact that half the people who work for me in my
company are all formerly homeless. That we train the homeless. That we brought
jobs for the homeless. That we create housing for the homeless. That our next
project is 20 percent low income affordable and 80 percent moderate income
affordable.
Bernard Harcourt: Is that around here?
Tom Gilmore: Yeah. Half a block, right on Spring Street. But I mean, her—
and I hate to sound cliché—her paradigm is dead. That paradigm is so over,
130). The ordinance also relaxes fire and life-safety requirements, as well as several other city residential codes
regarding parking, height and floor-area space requirements, and commercial corner development. Id.
107
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where it’s about super poor people and super rich people and there is nothing in
between. And I am one of the strongest advocates in the state of California for
housing. Mixed income housing separates those who can’t afford high-end
housing, but live a life that is amendable to a neighborhood.111
The real solution, Tom argues, is mixed income housing,112 because that’s what will
help those who are working, but have low incomes. “The working poor are the most
extraordinarily important group of people,” he maintains, “because they are either the
foundation of the new community or they are the foundation of the soon-to-be-homeless and
that’s a group you have to deal with radically. But you can’t all put them in a hole. Like the
one in Chicago that got tore down. . . It didn’t work in New York in the projects. It didn’t
work in the Bronx. . . .”113
It’s not clear, though, whether Skid Row is going to get mixed-income housing.
High-end residential lofts for young professionals are cropping up all around Skid Row.
Some are even showing up on the Row itself. Walter Beaumont, assistant project manager at
the Community Redevelopment Agency (“CRA”) reports that there is great demand for loft
space in the Downtown area, due primarily to the changing demographics of the homebuying population.114 Young professionals without children are much more open to living in
an urban environment than families with children.115
And the demand is being met—at least on the high-end side. To the South-West,
many of the garment factories are closing down.116 The jobs are being exported, and the
factories are being converted into residential loft space.117 On the North-East, galleries and
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art spaces are popping up, bringing with them live-in artist studios.118 New lofts are also
coming on-line in the adjacent neighborhoods of Little Tokyo, Bunker Hill, and South Park.
The Downtown area is literally blooming with residential developments.119 And the
marketing, often, draws on New York City appeal. The sales pitch frequently splices in a
reference or two to New York. Take a look, for instance, at The Barry Lofts, on Fifth Street
in the “Arts District” near Skid Row. The lofts are billed: “Los Angeles Lofts. . . New York
style!”120
The Downtown Center Los Angeles BID published a list on the Internet of
“Development Projects” in the greater Downtown Los Angeles area in September 2004.121
The list included more than $5.3 billion in renovation and construction costs for commercial
and residential properties.122 The new and renovated residential loft space in the Downtown
area is on or near Skid Row.123 The list includes the following projects:
Table: List of Loft Developments in Greater Downtown Los Angeles, March 2003.
ADDRESS

NAME

DEVELOPER

NO. OF LOFTS

The Pegasus

612 S. Flower St.

Kor Realty Group

322

Orsini Apartments

Figueroa & Sunset

G.H. Palmer Assoc.

297

Bartlett Building

215 W. 7th

Mini LLC

139

South Park Lofts

816 S. Grand Ave

Martin Building Co.

56

1300 S. Figueroa

(same)

Tri Cal Construction

100

Higgins Building

108 W. 2nd Street

LADT LLC

143

Little Tokyo Lofts

420 S. San Pedro St.

Peterson & Tansey

161

Flower Street Lofts

1140 S. Flower St.

CIM Group

91

The Gas Company Lofts

810 S. Flower St.

CIM Group

251

Coulter & Mandel Bldgs.

SWC Olive & 7th St.

Moussa & Mary Peykar

51

5th & Broadway

501 S. Broadway

Mini LLC

280

Orpheum Lofts

842 S. Broadway

Steve Needleman

37
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120
See The Barry Lofts website at http://barrylofts.com.
121
Downtown Center Los Angeles BID, Development Projects Greater Downtown Los Angeles (April 22,
2003) available at http://downtownla.com/frame.asp?mainPage=pdfs/econ_residential/DT_Project Pipeline.pdf
(last visited Feb 22, 2005).
122
Id.
123
Id.
119

Bernard E. Harcourt

Policing L.A.’s Skid Row

31

Hope Street Lofts

SWC Hope St. & Olympic

Florence Enterprises LLC

30

The Piero

616 S. St. Paul Street

G.H. Palmer & Associates

225

Stock Exchange Building

618 S. Spring Street

Oxford Street Properties

2 floors

El Dorado Hotel

416 S. Spring St.

Gilmore Associates

66

Grand Promenade Apts.

Grand & Kosciuszko Way

CRA

300-400

Santa Fe Loft II

121 E. 6th St.

Kor Realty Group

98

The Sassony Building

626 S. Spring St.

Dromy Investment Corp.

Office building

The Market Lofts

Flower, 9th Street

CIM Group

500

The Yards

4th St. & Traction Ave.

Dynamic Builders

6-story

Main Mercantile Bldg.

620 S. Main Street

Igdaloff

42

1st & Alameda

500 E. 1st St

Trammell Crow

800

Grand Avenue Lofts

11th Street & Grand

CIM Group & Lee Group

125

The Union

760 S. Hill Street

Heisman Properties

94

Irvine Byrne Building

249-259 S. Broadway

Oxford Street Properties

40

Mercantile Arcade Bldg

540 S. Broadway

Fifth Street Funding Inc.

143

Rowan Building Lofts

458 S. Spring St.

Gilmore Associates

209

Subway Terminal Bldg.

417 S. Hill St.

System Property Dev.

277

The Met Lofts

NEC 11th St. & Flower St.

Forest City Development

264

Security Building

510 S. Spring St.

Urban Pacific

153

Pacific Electronic Bldg

610 S. Main St.

ICO Investment Group

314

Visconti

NEC of 3rd & Bixel St.

G.H. Palmer Associates

300

Victor Clothing Bldg.

242 S. Broadway

Clinton Financial Corp.

38

Santee Court

Los Angeles & 7th Street

MJW Investments

Industrial bldg

Far East Café Bldg.

347-353 E. 1st Street

Little Tokyo CDC

16

Fidelity Investments

95

Library Court

th

630 W. 6 Street
th

The National

SWC Grand Ave & 6 Street

Heisman Properties

94

The Douglas Building

257 S. Spring St.

Douglas Building LLC

50

Olympic Lofts

409 W. Olympic Blvd.

Michael & Gaz Gilardian

78

The Los Angeles County Economic Development Corporation (“LAEDC”) reports
that there is, as of February 2004, “substantial residential development” in the Downtown
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area, with “27 structures being converted and 7 new buildings under construction.”124 Many
of those sites are outside Skid Row, though they are nearby it.125 The forecasters note that
there is a question as to how long this residential “boom,” in their words, will last.126 “The
obvious market for Downtown residential is urban pioneers, young professionals, and
empty-nesters,” they observe.127 “In addition, districts immediately adjacent to Downtown,
such as Silver Lake, Echo Park, and Lincoln Heights have become ‘hip.’ So the Downtown
housing boom could continue for some time.”128 On a less positive note, they add, “If there
is any controversy in this trend, it is that most of the new housing is in market rate units.
Community activists have pushed for more subsidized apartment units.”129
About half a mile North West of Skid Row are a number of new cultural institutions
that are also affecting the character of the Downtown area.130 These include the new Frank
Gehry Disney Concert Hall, home to the Los Angeles Philharmonic, the new Roman
Catholic Cathedral, and the Museum of Modern Art. This leads to a lot of optimism among
some for the Downtown area as a whole. The County suggests that “efforts to revitalize
downtown Los Angeles are well underway, with a wide variety of projects currently
scheduled including apartment, residential loft, hotel, restaurant, supermarket, retail, and
office projects.131 Downtown Los Angeles currently has approximately 8,500 residential
units. With new residential projects in the Historic Core and elsewhere, that number is
expected to more than double to 19,000 residents by 2004.”132 An article in the Los Angeles
Downtown News in 2001 predicts a doubling of the residential market over a four-year
period.133 “Long-awaited amenities steadily began to follow,” they write, “signaling a new
life for the recovering metropolis.”134 Here is Roseanne Dubin, reporting for the Urban
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Land, as early as October 2000:
According to the Downtown Center Business Improvement District (BID), it
is estimated that by the year 2002, a staggering $3 billion-plus will have been
invested in restoration projects in the city’s historic core as well as in
commercial building. With downtown Los Angeles now at the center of a massive
rehabilitation endeavor, the question is whether Angelenos will be open to the
idea of residing in a city known for dilapidated buildings and a 12-hour life
cycle. City officials say “yes,” and developers are banking on it.135
To be sure, given the blighted conditions on Skid Row and the larger surrounding
area, real estate values remain slightly depressed. Office vacancy rates are at about 33.8
percent, in contrast to about 14.6 percent for the whole Downtown Los Angeles area.136
Office lease rates stand at about $15.37 per square foot, lower than the average $23.99 per
square foot for the Downtown area as a whole.137 And the rents in the area (averaging at
$1.75 per square foot) are apparently insufficient to provide a reasonable return (apparently
about $3.00 per square foot would be required).138 Nonetheless, indications are that the
market is warming up. The average rents in the central city area actually increased almost 10
percent during the period 2001-2003.139 “The price of older downtown office buildings that
can be converted to residential have increased to more than $50 a square foot from $25 a
foot five years ago, according to Mark Weinstein, president of MJW Investment Inc., which
is developing the $120 million Santee Court mixed-use project in the Fashion District.”140
The city of Los Angeles did have plans to significantly invest in low-income
subsidized housing in the area, but it is not clear whether those plans will materialize.141 The
CRA put together a $2.4 billion redevelopment project for the central city Downtown Los
Angeles area—known as the proposed City Center Redevelopment Project.142 The proposed
project area, which was approximately 879 acres in total, was bounded by Second Street to
the North, San Pedro Street to the East, Figueroa Street to the West, and the Santa Monica
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Freeway to the South.143 As such, it caught half of Skid Row in its ambit—the western
portion, West of San Pedro Street, that includes the “Toy District.”144
The redevelopment plan was ambitious. It included the acquisition and development
of new commercial space, a convention center and industrial space (at a price tag of
approximately $667 million), public infrastructure improvements, including the initiation of
a historic trolley transit system (at about $260 million), the construction of cultural,
educational and public art facilities (at about $98 million), as well as a significant infusion
of resources for housing the poor, low- and moderate-income residents.145 The housing
allotment included $150 million for homelessness reduction and services, including the
rehabilitation of 1,500 SRO units and the construction of mental health and homeless
facilities, as well as $1.16 billion for the construction of new low- and moderate-income
housing.146
The County of Los Angeles objected to the proposed City Center Redevelopment
Project. They asserted that the project was an illegitimate way of trying to “obtain tax
increment revenue to fund a public subsidy for the construction of the convention center
hotel.”147 In other words, the county fought the project in order to safeguard the tax revenues
that would otherwise have gone to the project for the county and its school districts.148 The
county maintained that “many urban theorists believe that master-planned, large-scale
developments do not revitalize cities, and [that] alternative models have been more
successful in revitalizing other cities.”149 A superior court judge ruled against the city and
derailed the project in July 2003.150 The CRA and city are appealing—primarily by
challenging the findings concerning the blighted nature of the parking lots around the
Staples Center.151 However, their likelihood of success is uncertain.152
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According to Tom Gilmore, though, the real problems of Skid Row are about a lot
more than housing. They have to do with drug dependence, mental illness, physical battery,
and they will not be resolved by building more SRO housing—especially if the housing is
all clustered in one ghetto. Tom explains:
Alice can’t seem to differentiate between those people who are, for lack of a
better word, “chronically homeless”— people who do have substance abuse
issues, do have mental issue, who are battered wives, are a number of those
things, who have problems and need assisted living, who need shelter plus care.
That’s a different animal, that’s one step shy of hospitalization, and that’s not
what housing stock is all about.
Housing stock is about creating the steps for affordable and moderate and
market rate housing. . . . Special needs housing, shelter plus care, all that, that’s
a different animal and that’s something we would be in the same zone about
[Alice and me]. The only place I would differ with her on that is centralizing it is
horrible for everybody. It needs to be geographically dispersed.
. . . Now, here’s the question: If I build more housing, is that going to help
that? This is not about housing. It is not about housing. It is about something
way, way more complex. Problem is, who is going to be willing to deal with that
level of complexity? Who?153
Who? Tom Gilmore, Tom tells me. He’s the one having a positive impact on the
Row. He’s the one providing mixed-income housing. He’s the one drawing attention to the
plight of the homeless. He’s the one bringing politicians and people with power—politicians
such as Fabian Núñez—in direct contact with the problems of homelessness and disorder.
He’s the one coming up with solutions. Tom has a plan, he insists:
[I]f there’s a goal on my part, it is not to eliminate places like Union Rescue
Mission, Weingart, Los Angeles Mission, Midnight Mission. But to focus on what
is only half of what Giuliani and Bratton were doing. That is, to separate this
notion of homelessness and criminality.
The notion that. . . it is not criminal to be homeless is absolutely true. There
is a parallel to it . . . To a very large extent, many cities including New York ,
Philadelphia, Chicago and everything, would criminalize homelessness in an
effort to stem criminal behavior amongst the homeless.
And I think that fine line gets lost—that somehow criminal behavior is not
okay whether it’s in a homeless environment or in . . . a home “full”
environment. . . . Homelessness in and of itself isn’t a crime. There is crime in
those areas, and it shouldn’t get a de facto free ride in areas considered to be

CRA generally contributes between 20 and 30 percent of the $100,000-per-unit cost of the trust’s projects.” Id.
While the demise of the redevelopment project thus significantly affects the non-profit development, in
contrast the high-end loft developers are privately financed and their pursuits are not likely to be affected by
the collapse of the CRA project. Id.
153
Interview with Tom Gilmore (Sept 10, 2004) (cited in note 3).
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frequented by the homeless.154
But is crime really getting a free pass on L.A.’s Skid Row? What is the LAPD doing
about disorder, drugs, and crime on the Row? And how come the area is getting redeveloped
if in fact street crime continues unabated? What is the relationship between the real estate
development and crime?

III.

The LAPD and Crime Trends in the Central District
L.A.’s Skid Row experiences a high rate of drug offending and the area logs more

drug sale arrests than most other areas in Los Angeles.155 There are also high rates of
disorderliness as specifically defined in the broken windows theory.156 Public disorder
offenses are rampant, in large part because so many persons on the Row live in public.
Public intoxication, public urination, public sex, public lewdness, loitering—these public
crimes flourish on Skid Row, along with panhandling, encamping, and littering.157 In terms
of more serious UCR Part I crimes, it is difficult to get a reliable metric on Skid Row,
particularly in comparison to adjacent or other areas of Los Angeles. The challenge stems
primarily from the Row’s low residential and geographic density as compared to its high
spatial and commercial density. It is also difficult to assess the extent to which serious
crimes are reported in the Skid Row area, particularly by homeless victims.
In terms of precinct comparisons, Skid Row is unique. It is a warehouse and light
industrial district immediately adjacent to the busy Downtown skyscrapers. It has low
residential density: once the warehouses and wholesale outlets close in the late afternoon,
the area is effectively turned over to the destitute and homeless. At the same time, there is
high spatial density. These are relatively large warehouses and businesses, without front or
back yards. During the day, the area also experiences heavy population density due to traffic
from the adjacent financial downtown area, Chinatown, the Garment District, the
Convention Center, and other highly populated day-time venues.
To the North-West, in the part of Skid Row that is being renamed the “Toy District,”
there are a lot of wholesale, Asian-import toy stores that sell retail as well, with a lot of
154

Interview with Tom Gilmore (Sept 10, 2004) (cited in note 3).
Winton and Sauerwein, LAPD Tests New Policing Strategy; Chief picks three areas as proving grounds
for his ‘broken windows’ system to fight crime, LA Times at B1 (cited in note 78).
156
Id.
155

Bernard E. Harcourt

Policing L.A.’s Skid Row

37

beanie babies and other plastic toys in boxes on the sidewalk. Here, during the day, the
sidewalks are cluttered with toys for sale and merchant goods. A few representative
sidewalks look as follows:
* * * Insert photo.20 and photo.21 here * * *
To the South-East, in the part of the Row being renamed the “Downtown Industrial
District” to the South-East, there are warehouses and fish processing plants. Many of the
warehouses are windowless. Others are abandoned. Boxes are strewn about. Here are a few
representative sidewalks:
* * * Insert photo.30 and photo.31 here * * *
The geo- and demographic uniqueness of Skid Row is reflected in the LAPD’s
distribution of police resources—specifically, in the coverage of the police stations. Skid
Row is covered by the Central Community Police Station, which is located in the heart of
the neighborhood on Fifth Street and Maple, equidistant between San Pedro and Main
Streets. Central Community police station serves not only Skid Row, but also the Downtown
financial district, the Fashion District, Chinatown, Little Tokyo, the Convention Center, the
Historic Core, and the emerging gallery district; and it is part of the Central Bureau, which
also includes the Rampart, Hollenbeck, Northeast, and Newton Community Police Stations.
A few maps put this all in perspective. The first map reflects the geography of the full
Central Bureau, which includes the Central Community Police Station area at its center, and
Skid Row (marked in crosshatch shading). The second map represents the Central
Community Police Station coverage, which includes Skid Row (again marked with
crosshatch shading).
* * * Insert police.map.1 and police.map.2 * * *
As these maps illustrate, the Central Community Police Station covers more than just
Skid Row. But Skid Row accounts for approximately a quarter of total UCR Part I offenses
in the area covered by the Central Community Police Station. It accounts for approximately
30 percent of robberies and 42 percent of aggravated assaults. This is reflected in the
157

Dickerson, Befouled Businesses near LA’s Skid Row Seek Relief in the Law, LA Times at B1 (cited in
note 170).
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following Table 1, which uses data for the fourth quarter of 2003.

Table 1: Skid Row Reported Crime as a Proportion of Total Crime in Central Community Police
Station Area (December 2003).
Homicide

Rape

Robbery

Skid Row

1

0

17

Other

1

1

TOTAL

2

% Skid Row
% Other

Agg
Assault

Pers
Theft

Burglary

B/T Auto

32

7

12

6

39

44

34

92

0

56

76

41

50

0

30

42

50

100

70

58

Other
Theft

Auto Theft

Total

22

7

105

11

83

43

347

104

17

105

50

452

17

12

35

21

14

23

83

88

65

79

86

77

Source: Part I Crimes by RD (28 Day Period) from 11/30/03 to 12/27/03
Aggravated Assaults exclude Domestic Violence (CC:223, 236)
The Report is Based on the Date of Occurrence of Crime
Skid Row = RD 135, 138, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 164, 166
Exhibit to Kelling 2004.

Of critical importance is the fact that the area covered by the Central Community
Police Station has the lowest population of any of the eighteen community police stations,
the lowest street mileage of any station, and the lowest square mileage as well. These
features are reflected in the following table listing the relevant statistics for the eighteen
police station areas covered by the LAPD.
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TABLE 2: POPULATION AND SIZE OF AREA COVERED BY LAPD STATIONS (2002)
COMMUNITY
POLICE STATION

POPULATION STREET
MILES

SQUARE
MILES

Central
Rampart
Hollenbeck
Northeast
Newton

42,978
285,210
210,978
265,675
152,372

139
211
365
636
247

4.89
7.39
15.53
29.25
9.79

957,213

1,598

66.85

175,816
183,630
187,536
136,744

301
566
298
258

12.37
25.84
11.31
9.26

683,726

1,423

58.78

207,070
250,048
230,512
214,886

365
353
748
544

17.56
13.98
65.14
25.62

902,516

2,010

122.3

273,490
316,468
234,420
281,304
257,863

503
905
511
787
823

27.62
54.51
24.84
62.12
54.19

1,363,545

3,529

223.28

3,907,000

8,560

471.21

Central Bureau
Southwest
Harbor
77th Street
Southeast
South Bureau
Hollywood
Wilshire
West L.A.
Pacific
West Bureau
Van Nuys
West Valley
N.Hollywood
Foothill
Devonshire
Valley Bureau
GRAND TOTAL

Source: LAPD 2002 Statistical Digest, page 1.2

Skid Row has the smallest residential population and geographic area, making interdistrict comparisons inappropriate. It is, in this sense, extremely difficult to find a reliable
metric to compare Skid Row—and the Central Community Police Station area more
generally—to other areas of Los Angeles in terms of crime. The metric cannot be the
residential population, nor geography—which show greatly disproportional crimes per
capita or per mile—nor for that matter the number of police officers assigned to the area,
since that number is also metrically arbitrary insofar as it is determined by the police
administration.
Nevertheless, a raw analysis of the reported crime figures for the Central Bureau, in
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comparison to the other police districts, reveals two important features.158 First, in terms of
raw numbers, the area covered by the Central Community Police Station has traditionally
experienced roughly average levels of reported UCR Part I offenses as compared to other
police stations. This is clear from Table 3 which records reported crimes for the year 2002 in
the different districts.
Table 3: 2002 Total Number of Offenses by Police Station
Police Station

Part I
Offenses

Homicide

Rape

Agg. Assault

Robberies

Burglary

Central
Rampart
Hollenbeck
Northeast
Newton
CENTRAL

8046
11019
7411
9996
9717
46189

17
46
49
26
49
187

53
100
28
71
58
310

1151
2607
1397
1466
1996
8617

1213
1492
588
704
1172
5169

742
1130
852
1395
1091
5210

Southwest
Harbor
77th Street
Southeast
SOUTH

13699
8241
11817
9389
43146

52
34
117
65
268

92
46
102
93
333

2646
1530
3425
2775
10376

1442
584
1640
1269
4935

1498
1137
1420
1423
5478

Hollywood
Wilshire
West L.A.
Pacific
WEST

10933
12970
7112
10131
41146

24
31
12
16
83

87
99
40
44
270

1442
2108
652
775
4977

1116
1437
431
591
3575

1118
1744
1287
1365
5514

11648
12312
11272
9510
13118
57860
188341

11
20
23
32
23
109
647

62
56
53
84
50
305
1218

1705
1563
1456
1907
1649
8280
32250

752
715
682
637
662
3448
17127

1656
2046
1625
1415
1886
8628
24830

Van Nuys
West Valley
No. Hollywood
Foothill
Devonshire
VALLEY
CITY WIDE

Source: LAPD 2002 Statistical Digest

158

A more refined analysis using census tract/RD data is underway. But for present purposes, an overview
of the reported crimes in the Central Community Police Station area gives an adequate background.
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But second, and perhaps more importantly, the historical trend for the Skid Row area
seems to be unique. Over the course of the past six years, the Central area has not seen the
declines in crime experienced by other districts. Reported crime in the Central area has been
sticky, despite the sharp declines in other districts. This is true for total UCR Part I offenses,
but also true for individual reported crimes. In terms of robbery victimization, for instance,
the Central area experienced an increase of 6 percent in reported robberies over the period
1997 to 2002, in contrast to a drop of 16 percent across the city overall, with some districts
experiencing declines in reported robberies ranging from 26 to 34 percent.
The difference is quite remarkable: reported crimes have not gone down in the Skid
Row and downtown areas. In some cases, they have even increased, despite measurable
drops in other areas of Los Angeles. In fact, the contrast in general crime trends between
Skid Row and the city of Los Angeles as a whole is striking. Across the city there have been
substantial decreases in reported crime across the board for UCR Part I offenses from 1993
to 2002. Of particular note is the fact that UCR Part I crimes fell in each category during that
ten-year period.
The contrast between trends in the Central area versus trends in the other police
districts is reflected well in the following two tables:
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Table 4: Longitudinal Crime Rates by Police Station: Total Part I Offenses
Police Station

2002

2001

2000

1999

1998

1997

% change
1997 to
2002

Central
Rampart
Hollenbeck
Northeast
Newton
CENTRAL

8046
11019
7411
9996
9717
46189

8084
11893
7098
9767
9643
46485

8154
10917
7004
9486
9152
44713

7572
9677
6828
8487
8257
40821

7636
10050
7348
9087
8885
43006

8137
11622
8178
10354
9756
48047

-1%
-5%
-9%
-3%
0%
-4%

Southwest
Harbor
77th Street
Southeast
SOUTH

13699
8241
11817
9389
43146

12466
8241
11217
8966
40890

11737
8197
10740
8983
39657

11255
7149
10162
8745
37311

11017
7917
11032
9031
38997

12874
9442
11564
10245
44125

6%
-13%
2%
-8%
-2%

Hollywood
Wilshire
West L.A.
Pacific
WEST

10933
12970
7112
10131
41146

10713
13107
7614
10607
42041

9669
12510
7526
11308
41013

9100
12453
6731
10996
39280

10567
13619
8366
13301
45853

12351
16347
9664
14531
52893

-11%
-21%
-26%
-30%
-22%

Van Nuys
West Valley
No. Hollywood
Foothill
Devonshire
VALLEY

11648
12312
11272
9510
13118
57860

11665
12545
11335
9526
12582
57653

11013
11936
10265
8641
12245
54100

10224
10879
9335
7803
11434
49675

10910
12233
10548
9655
12136
55482

14039
13484
11926
10604
11139
61192

-17%
-9%
-5%
-10%
18%
-5%

188341

187069

179483

167087

183338

206257

-9%

CITY WIDE

Source: LAPD Statistical Digests
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Table 5: Longitudinal Crime Rates by Police Station: Total Robbery Offenses
% change
Police Station
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1997 to
2002
Central
Rampart
Hollenbeck
Northeast
Newton
CENTRAL

1213
1492
588
704
1172
5169

1038
1639
597
764
1171
5209

859
1379
627
743
1143
4751

926
1259
550
572
964
4271

1014
1300
675
685
1017
4691

1141
1690
795
919
1430
5975

6%
-12%
-26%
-23%
-18%
-13%

Southwest
Harbor
77th Street
Southeast
SOUTH

1442
584
1640
1269
4935

1298
547
1459
1186
4490

1210
490
1395
1190
4285

1092
515
1308
1009
3924

1180
519
1346
1079
4124

1640
696
1656
1461
5453

-12%
-16%
-1%
-13%
-9%

Hollywood
Wilshire
West L.A.
Pacific
WEST

1116
1437
431
591
3575

1118
1380
444
543
3485

1012
1211
405
603
3231

828
1231
384
579
3022

967
1340
441
656
3404

1416
2016
651
838
4921

-21%
-29%
-34%
-29%
-27%

Van Nuys
West Valley
No. Hollywood
Foothill
Devonshire
VALLEY

752
715
682
637
662
3448

742
801
791
712
819
3865

626
642
639
575
730
3212

609
570
576
548
665
2968

748
665
648
612
731
3404

935
792
796
694
763
3980

-20%
-10%
-14%
-8%
-13%
-13%

17127

17049

15479

14185

15623

CITY WIDE

20329

-16%

Source: LAPD Statistical Digests

These tables reflect that reported crime—especially robbery—has remained a significant
problem in the Central area.
As for policing, the LAPD Central Community station has engaged in quality-of-life
enforcement and regular street sweeps of Skid Row for many years now, well before
William Bratton assumed responsibility as police chief in October 2002.159 Two massive
sweeps, for instance, had been planned well in advance and were implemented in November
and December 2002.160 In both, joint tactical teams of federal, state, and county officers, as
159

Megan Garvey and Richard Winton, Bratton Touts a Year of Progress at the LAPD, LA Times A1 (Oct
28, 2003) (noting that Bratton joined in ‘sweeps’ of parolees and homeless people after identifying Skid Row,
MacArthur Park, and Hollywood as targets for his belief that attention to minor crimes lead to less major
crime).
160
Robert Erlenbusch, Deposition in Cervantes v International Services, Inc, No BC220226 at 138, Sup Ct
of California (Jan 20, 2004). See also Winton and Sauerwein, LAPD Tests New Policing Strategy; Chief picks
three areas as proving grounds for his ‘broken windows’ system to fight crime, LA Times at 1 (Feb 2, 2003)
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well as probation and parole supervisors, went through the Skid Row hotels checking up on
parolees in what resembled a Boston-style “Operation Night Light” intervention.161
According to the L.A. Times, an analysis of the resulting 185 arrests showed that “parole
violators made up most of the arrests, a majority of which were of people who had been
convicted of drug offenses. In addition to the 185 arrested, 100 people were issued citations,
mostly for minor infractions.”162
But even putting aside these massive sweeps, the LAPD performed ordermaintenance policing regularly and routinely. Captain Charlie Beck, who’s been with the
LAPD for 27 years and, up until June 2003, was assigned to Central, reports that, on a daily
basis, the sanitation department would clean streets in Skid Row accompanied by two or
three police officers who, together, would attempt to clear the streets of property, tents, and
encampments.163 The police routinely enforce jaywalking and other kinds of quality-of-life
offenses. As Sergeant Campbell of the LAPD explains, the police regularly get called out on
“illegal encampments; sleeping in doorways of businesses; campfire lighting; loitering;
lying, sleeping on the sidewalks in front of businesses; blocking pedestrians’ walkway; . . .
taking clothes off, bathing, dressing in the streets, panhandling, begging from customers
coming in and our of businesses . . . [or] [e]ntering businesses and becoming a
disturbance.”164 Alice Callahan reports:
There have been week-ends and periods of time when the [police would
(cited in note 78). Robert Erlenbusch, the executive director for the Los Angeles Coalition to End Hunger and
Homelessness, recounts how one of his staff members, who lived in an SRO, was caught in one of these
massive sweeps and how traumatic the experience was for him. See Erlenbusch Deposition at 162.
161
See Indira A.R. Lakshamanan, Team Effort Slows Tide of Youth Violence in City, Boston Globe A1
(July 22, 1996). “Operation Night Light” in Boston put probation officers on the streets with police officers.
Before Operation Night Light, probation officers and police officers did not communicate with each other even
though a large portion of the offenders that they each came into contact with were the same people. Like
Operation Cease Fire, Operation Night Light was an innovative program that relied on joint enforcement using
parole and probation at its core. See generally, David M. Kennedy, Juvenile Gun Violence and Gun Markets in
Boston, NIJ Research Preview, (March 1997) available at:http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/fs000160.pdf (last
visited Feb 22, 2005).
162
Winton and Sauerwein, LAPD Tests New Policing Strategy; Chief picks three areas as proving grounds
for his ‘broken windows’ system to fight crime, LA Times at B1 (cited in note 78).
163
Charlie Beck Deposition at 21–26 (cited in note 54).
164
Campbell Deposition at 32 (cited in note 50). Alice Callahan describes what happens when the police
give tickets for these quality-of-life offense: “Every kind of quality-of-life issue you get a ticket, and then you
go to community court which is then going to sentence you to a program. You can choose now to go into a
program instead of going to jail.” Interview with Alice Callahan (Sept 11, 2004) (cited in note 2). These low
level offenses serve as mechanism for control, and, as Callahan explains, “the problem, of course is, nobody
stays with a program they didn’t choose to go to. But once they agree to that and they leave, which they almost
always do, and they violate it, now they’re wanted for violating the conditions of their parole or probation or
whatever it was.” Id.

Bernard E. Harcourt

Policing L.A.’s Skid Row

45

arrest everyone on the street]. . . . You have some officers who do nothing else
but go out and harass people. Maybe because they enjoy it, I don’t know. We
have one police lieutenant who would drive routinely down San Julian a block
away, early in the morning, would put his speaker on and say “Who wants to go
to jail today?” Just perverse sort of stuff.165
In addition to the LAPD, the Red Shirts engage in constant quality-of-life
policing.166 As Captain Beck explains, the Red Shirts “enforce the law and make citizen
arrests.”167 “They call the police officers any time they see any illegal activity,” Sergeant
Campbell adds; “I do know they have made citizen’s arrests just by overhearing officers
talk.”168 Callahan recounts:
The Red Shirts will stand with a group of guys drinking, and they will
call and call and call until a policeman comes. You will hear them over the
scanner. “We have a health and safety problem over here. In front of this
business, and the owner wants it gone.” They will go to an encampment
where people are sitting and they will stand there and say “We’re going to
call the police, you’re sitting on the sidewalk.’ So the Shirts have managed to
make it much, much more difficult for people.169
According to Walter Beaumont of the CRA, the Red Shirts provide “constant surveillance”
of a relatively small area, a type of community policing that allows them to get to know the
local property owners.170 Some businesses also hire, as extra precaution, their own private
security.171
Alice Callahan strikes back, handing out leaflets, flyers, and a “Survival Manual.”
Here’s a leaflet or two, and a few pages from the manual:

165

Interview with Alice Callahan (Sept 11, 2004) (cited in note 2).
An interesting question concerns the role and contribution of BIDs to crime rates. Leah Brooks, a Ph.D.
student at UCLA, is conducting interesting research on the impact of BIDs on crime. In her research, Brooks
preliminarily finds that, across all her estimations, “BIDs are associated with large declines of at least 5 to 9
percent in total crime, where the bulk of this decline is attributable to decreases in serious crime.” Leah
Brooks, Volunteering to Be Taxed: Business Improvement Districts and the Extra-Governmental Provision of
Public Safety, working paper, at 4 (Nov 5, 2004).
167
Charlie Beck Deposition at 53 (cited in note 54).
168
Campbell Deposition at 19 (cited in note 50). According to Campbell, “There have been [Red Shirt]
security guards going through the big eight-hour training who possess the guard card, they can. . . place people
under citizen’s arrest.” Campbell Deposition at 28.
169
Interview with Alice Callahan (Sept 11, 2004) (cited in note __).
170
Interview with Walter Beaumont, (March 12, 2004) (cited in note 93).
171
See Daniel Gomez, Deposition in Cervantes v. International Services, Inc., Superior Court of
California, No. BC220226, at 42 (November 21, 2003).
166
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At times, the LAPD act as a buffer between the homeless and the Red Shirts.
According to some on the Row, LAPD officers have intervened on their behalf when they
were being manhandled by the BID security guards.172 Most of the time, though, the police
172

See Third Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Damages in Cervantes v
International Services, Inc, No BC220226 at ¶¶12-17, Sup Ct of California (date). According to Armando
Cervantes, for example, he was yelled at, manhandled, forcibly searched, handcuffed and detained in a private

Bernard E. Harcourt

Policing L.A.’s Skid Row

47

are busy arresting people. As Callahan explains:
[They arrest] people for sitting, sleeping and lying on the public sidewalk.
They’ll go at night wake people and arrest them routinely. . . . They do it
selectively either depending on how many people they have or how much they are
pressing. I have no idea what accounts for the spots and the days they do it. I
think for instance the owner of the building next door to us does not let people
sleep in front of there. So I give permission for people to sleep and it’s actually a
part of the sidewalk recessed into our door. I routinely get police showing up—as
many as three or four police showing up—telling people that it’s illegal, they
can’t be there. I have to go out and go through the whole thing again.173
“Sweeps here are extremely effective,” Tom Gilmore adds, “because everyone there
has a warrant out for them. Everyone. Everyone. You can literally make a sweep and say,
“Can I see some ID?” and they are going to jail.”174
William Bratton originally came to Los Angeles on a platform that promised more
broken-windows policing and greater attention to quality-of-life. According to the New York
Times, “Mr. Bratton said his first priority after being sworn in on Oct. 28 [2002] would be
ending the smile-and-wave approach to crime fighting. He said he wanted policing based on
the so-called broken-windows theory.”175 In October 2002, after being selected by Mayor
James Hahn to head the LAPD, Bratton told the press that “he will make graffiti a top
priority for all officers.”176 He also identified Skid Row as one of three areas in L.A. where
he would target and test broken-windows policing, with a special emphasis on graffiti.177
The media reports: “Far from trivial, Bratton said, fighting graffiti is the key to reducing
crime overall and solving more serious offenses—from drug dealing to murder.”178 The L.A.
Times continues:

security force squad car for 25 minutes by several “red shirts” and his property (namely his medication for a
broken leg and leg surgery) were taken from him, before the LAPD intervened on his behalf and secured his
release. Id.
173
Interview with Alice Callahan (Sept 11, 2004) (cited in note 2).
174
Interview with Tom Gilmore (Sept 10, 2004) (cited in note 3).
175
Charlie LeDuff, Los Angeles Police Chief Faces a Huge Challenge, NY Times A22(Oct 24, 2002). As
LeDuff explains, the broken-windows theory “holds that small quality-of-life crimes eventually encourage
greater lawlessness. If graffiti and broken windows are tolerated, for instance, eventually prostitution and drug
dealing and companion violence will find their ways to the street corners.” Id. See generally Harcourt, Illusion
of Order 23-27(cited in note __).
176
Tina Daunt and Megan Garvey, Bratton Lays Out Ambitious Set of Goals for LAPD, LA Times A1
(Oct 4, 2002).
177
David Rosenzweig and Eric Malnic, California; Police Sweeps of Skid Row Are Curbed, LA Times
B1(April 3, 2003). See also Eric Malnic, Los Angeles; Police Continue Homeless Sweeps on Skid Row
Despite ACLU Suit, LA Times B3(February 21, 2003).
178
Megan Garvey, Bratton Is Planning a Clean Start; The police chief, who will be sworn in today, sees
fighting graffiti as key to reducing crime, LA Times A1 (Oct. 25, 2002).
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One of his first orders of business will be tackling the city’s graffiti problem,
which falls under the category of “quality of life” enforcement that was his
trademark as head of New York’s transit authority and as police commissioner.
“I was amazed to find that of 9,000 persons in the Police Department, not a
single one is focused on graffiti,” Bratton said. “As a result you look like the
graffiti capital of the world. . . . I’d like to see more focus on that issue because it
reflects community pride. It reflects a sense of caring.”179
To be sure, budget and resource constraints in L.A. have hampered Bratton’s plans.
Six months after taking office, in April 2003, Bratton disbanded the eleven-member
undercover LAPD transit police anti-graffiti unit—the Graffiti Habitual Offenders
Suppression Team (“GHOST”)—despite their enforcement successes. The unit apparently
had made over 500 graffiti-related arrests in the previous year.180 Moreover, again due to
budget constraints, the county sheriff, Lee Baca, has been releasing misdemeanor convicts
early—many after serving no time at all—thereby undermining the broken-windows
strategy.181 Bill Bratton himself has retreated from his earlier position on broken windows
enforcement, reportedly saying that he “didn’t have the resources to other than symbolically
speak to broken windows.”182
But the fact is, there was regular, routine, and constant order-maintenance policing
on Skid Row before Bratton arrived—by the LAPD and by the Red Shirts—and none of that
has really changed. There is, at the very least, the same level of broken-windows
enforcement that existed before Bratton’s selection.183 And yet, none of this broken
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windows policing has cleaned the streets, nor created order on L.A.’s Skid Row. The
pictures tell a million words: quality-of-life policing has had little effect on disorder, and, if
the raw statistical numbers are correct, little effect on serious crime.184 The interviews,
conversations, and depositions of those familiar with L.A.’s Skid Row are also telling. As
Sergeant Campbell explains, “The area in which [the Red Shirts] patrol is still one of our
hottest areas as far as violent crime, street crimes, and property crimes.”185 If anything, it
seems that Skid Row is becoming a regional drug market: “a magnet for addicts from
throughout the city, attracted by the availability of low-priced drugs.”186 And that,
apparently, “has created a new kind of skid row drug dealer: gang members from South Los
Angeles and Rampart who commute to Skid Row for the drug trade and return home at
night.”187
IV.

The Real Estate Battle over Skid Row
What seems to be driving urban renewal on L.A.’s Skid Row, then, is not order-

maintenance, street sweeps, broken windows policing, or positive crime trends, but instead
real estate redevelopment. And on these fronts, the SRO advocates and the loft developers
are in pitched battle. “The whole battle going on in [Skid] Row,” Alice Callahan confides to
me, “as any great big battle is ever about, is about real estate. That’s all it’s about. It’s about
real estate. So these battles about the sidewalk, and who controls, and who’s on the
sidewalk, putting bathrooms out—all we’re talking about is real estate: Who is going to win
the real estate?”188
Alice Callahan views the San Fernando Building as the beachhead. It is what’s
attracting these “young, urban professional seeking a New York-style, edgy feel.”189 It is
what’s “bringing people right onto the Row who will be afraid of the poor and who will

We do leaflets now that say look out for the police. When the police go by, I have to
warn the children to be careful of the police. . . .
So we are just going to fight a guerrilla warfare down here because there is nothing else
to do. . . . I have been on the Row full time since the 80s, 1981, and part time before that.
And the Catholic Workers have been around since the early 70s. And it’s never deteriorated
to this.
Interview with Alice Callahan (Sept 11, 2004) (cited in note 2).
184
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harass them out of the neighborhood.”190 Callahan has dissected Gilmore’s strategy and
understands it well:
The redevelopment agency for decades since the 1970s has tried to revitalize
the Old Historic core on Spring Street, Broadway, and Main Street. And they
failed. [Gilmore’s] conclusion was, they failed because the redevelopment
agency did isolated projects. So, by itself, you just go in and do one project,
people feel isolated and it fails. So he would come in and do whole blocks. And
he would provide the infrastructure necessary for people to feel happy and
content. So he’d put restaurants and grocery stores, so people living in his lofts
would have everything there – they’d have a whole new world created. And they
could come and sort of have their Disneyland Manhattan experience. . . .
So he began buying buildings there, and began moving people in at 4th and
Main, and the first building that he bought—talk about irony of ironies—had
been the City’s Housing Department offices, and they had booked out. . . So they
took one hotel that had housed homeless people, the Pacific Grand, converting
that to a boutique hotel. . . . Then he bought the City Housing Department,
bought the Old Bank building across the street, and there were days you’d go
buy and you’d think it was a movie lot because it was just a juxtaposition of that
one little corner and everything else around it. It was just dramatic. And then
they hired their security guards. . . And they’d put Pete’s café and all this other
stuff.191
Callahan is particularly troubled by these developments because so many of the
housing units of Skid Row are on Main Street. If Main Street becomes unaffordable for lowincome housing, then one-third of the Skid Row housing stock will disappear. “With
Gilmore buying [on 4th and Main], suddenly we can’t buy [on Main Street], and yet more
than one third of all the housing on Skid Row is [there].”192
Callahan, though, has her own strategy. Standing in front of the San Fernando
Building, Callahan gestures to an SRO caddy-corner across the way. “We put that one
there,” Callahan explains to me, “to make sure the yuppies in their lofts don’t get too
comfortable. To make sure we keep Skid Row a neighborhood for the homeless, a place to
fall back on when you are down-and-out. To make sure the neighborhood remains Skid
Row.”193
A strategist through and through, Callahan has her territory mapped out. She is
fighting an urban campaign. She has secured her borders. She explains to me:
190
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Skid Row Housing Trust intentionally, when it was set up in the 80s,
purchased hotels along the border of the Row. The idea was that if we could
protect our borders, then it makes it less attractive to come in. The other group,
SRO Inc., basically bought in a very small concentrated area of the Row. They
were willing to say “Okay here is the Row, 5th and San Julian.” They did not
mind if they shrunk the Row down. They do own a few hotels outside the area.
They are prepared to give up the Row. Again, their politics are different. The
redevelopment agency people are on their board. They are a city group.194
Callahan’s combat plan is to try to keep the young professionals out until she has
secured enough property to make sure that Skid Row remains Skid Row. Callahan has her
eyes on the large hotels. “That’s why Main Street is so important,” she explains, “because it
has all these huge buildings. . . . If we could buy this one, the Cecil, almost six hundred
rooms, on Seventh and Main, then we would be okay. . . . I feel if we can get the Rossmore,
then no one else will want to do the Frontier.”195
“If we can buy this one hotel I feel like we’ve check-mated this whole block,”
Callahan explains.196 “Because then, we own ten stories, and we move our most mentally ill
people into it and now nobody wants the others. And that’s the whole plan. And then again
once we secure the housing on the Row—so the poor can live here forever—then the service
is going to stay here, because that is what it is to service them. Then they can do anything
they want. But you always have to secure the property.”197
“The most important thing for us to do is to buy the housing on Skid Row,” Callahan
emphasizes. “I think it will take a decade or more because there is so much happening off
the Row that is beginning. And my hope is that, by the time they run out of stuff [off of Skid
Row but near by], we will own the buildings.” When she will have all the property she
needs, then there will be no problem gentrifying the area: “I don’t care if they do that on
Skid Row once we secure the housing. Then fine. Put all the wonderful building you want
on Skid Row. It is only an issue before we secure the real estate. That is all it is.”198 She
continues:
We want every building on the Row. And then we want to put up some
additional housing to house people. Every single affordable housing unit on Skid
Row has a waiting list. Every single one of those 45 hotels owned by a non-profit
has a waiting list. If we opened seven more hotels tomorrow, they would be filled.
194
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So we want to buy them all. We want the thousands of people who live on Main
Street to stay on Main Street.
It’s always about real estate.199
The problem, for Callahan, is that increasing real estate prices make it harder for her
non-profit to buy housing and preserve low-income residential space.200 Callahan explains:
That’s where the problem comes with Gilmore. . . . Gilmore will say, “Well, I
did not purchase any housing, I converted an office building.” That is true, but
what happened [when Tom Gilmore began purchasing buildings at the corner of
4th and Main] was, he then began land speculation all the way down Seventh
Street. So you would have groups from as far away as Chicago, who would now
suddenly, they would not care what the property was, they were just trading
paper. And the private developers can put a lot of cash down. The non-profits
were dependent on public money, so it takes a while to put the deal together. So
suddenly, we were not the attractive buyers.
So when we tried to buy the Rosslyn a couple of years ago, we could not buy
it because we were competing with a group from Chicago and some other
groups. That’s one of the big one’s at the corner of 5th and Main.
And my theory is, if we can get the Rosslyn, we win. Because who wants to
buy the huge one across the street if we filling the one at the corner with ten
floors of mentally ill, the poor, and the Row. So it is still my number one project
to get the Rosslyn. Cause it’s the one way I know of winning.201
Tom Gilmore is no less strategic, and, truth be told, there is no love lost between him
and Callahan. Gilmore views Callahan as a dinosaur. He does not mince his words either:
She’s a ideologue. . . I represent change [to her]. . . “They were here first.
This environment is not good, but it is at least their environment and they
shouldn’t be pushed out by gentrifying developers. .”
[To Callahan,] no good can ever come of change. . . Her world is black and
white. Her world is . . . it’s a cartoon world, you know.
***
What drives me crazy here is that Alice Callahan’s been here for, I don’t
know, twenty years — by the way living in Brentwood. . .
Harcourt: I don’t know where that is, what is that?
Gilmore: It’s the nice part of town
Harcourt: It’s the nice part of town, OK.
Gilmore: And we’ve been here four years, and I submit that we have made
more of a difference in four years, then she has made in fifteen. And not
199
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because we gentrified and made the streets clean by getting out a broom, but
because we provided an alternative to homelessness for a very large group of
people, who are now working and living in real homes, and we focused the
attention of Los Angeles on a problem they have been able to ignore for the
last fifteen to twenty years. LA has been able to its homeless problem because
no one gave a shit. Now, every one of these people that’s walking here wasn’t
walking here three years ago, and they are all going so what’s with the
homeless problem, and so its front and center now.202
Gilmore’s strategy is equally simple: buy more property in close proximity and
convert it. Gilmore is now hard at work on converting Saint Vibiana’s Cathedral, the former
seat of the Archdiocese of Los Angeles, a block away from the San Fernando. Gilmore
explains on his web site: the Cathedral “is currently under a long-term development plan
with future uses including performance spaces, a restaurant, a branch library for Little
Tokyo and housing. Built in 1876, the cathedral held 1000 people, which at that time was a
tenth of the population of Los Angeles.”203 Gilmore is also busy at work on the El Dorado
Hotel and the Rowan Building, both part of the Old Bank District Project.204
These real estate wars over Skid Row, though, are not entirely new. There is a long
and venerable history of such wrangling. The area known today as Skid Row has historically
engendered a lot of controversy.205 The hotels have been around since the early 1900s, but
since at least the mid-twentieth century, there have been recurring urban plans to redevelop
and reorganize the Row. In the period 1961–1964, the Community Redevelopment Agency
and the Businessmen’s Association (a Downtown group) jointly implemented the
“Centropolis” master plan, which was intended to shield the Downtown areas from the
presence of homeless by constructing a “buffer zone” along Main Street and Los Angeles
Street which was made up of light industrial buildings and parking lots.206 During 1973–
1974, the city and businesses tailored a new plan, the “Silverbrook” plan.207 Under that plan,
Skid Row would be eliminated “in order to free ‘Central City East’ for redevelopment as a
202
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‘joint university communications center and extension school.’”208 The process of
eliminating

Skid

Row

of

its

homeless

is

referred

to

under

this

plan

as

“deinstitutionalization.”209 But, there were other forces operating, particularly the pressure
from residents in other adjacent and more affluent areas.
During the late 1970s, there was a concerted effort to save the low-income housing
on Skid Row, while encouraging light industry.210 This was a period of zoning.211 San Pedro
Street, a larger thoroughfare, cuts through Skid Row in a North-South direction. East of San
Pedro was zoned light industrial. West of San Pedro was mixed-use zoning. These zoning
decisions, Callahan suggests, were critical, but uncontested, and will significantly impact the
future of Skid Row.212 A redevelopment agency in the 1980s was set up and created SRO
Inc., a quasi-public agency, to purchase houses on Skid Row.213
While many homeless advocates continued to champion relocation, others wanted
the homeless to stay in this one place. The City Council, at least through the early 1990s,
opted for the latter: “To prevent this exodus, the [L.A. City] Council majority has postponed
‘deinstitutionalization’ in favor of ‘containment’ (the policy’s official title) implemented by
the redevelopment agency and the LAPD.”214 This is how author Mike Davis describes the
policy of containment:
“Containment,” with its ominous Cold War resonance, is a deliberately
Janus-faced strategy. On the one hand, it is described by the redevelopment
agency as a systematic effort to preserve and upgrade the stock of single-resident
occupied (SRO) housing units in Skid Row, with the aim of humanizing, within
the scarce means possessed by the city, the condition of the downtown homeless.
On the other hand, as pursued by the LAPD, it is a relentless pressure to keep an
overcrowded indigent population from spilling over into downtown’s tonier
precincts, or from establishing semi-permanent encampments on adjacent open
spaces. But the contradiction between the two policies is only apparent. In fact,
both the CRA, by concentrating the SROs into one circumscribed core, and the
LAPD, by restricting the mobility of downtown street people, have collaborated
in the construction of a giant outdoor poor house.215
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Tom Gilmore agrees. He explains: “The reason it all happened down here is that
there was no ‘NIMBY-ism’ (not-in-my-back-yard). It’s because there was nobody here –
there was nobody in the field,” Gilmore explains.216 “At the maximum level of decay they
went ‘Hey, nobody will notice the homeless down here. We’ll put them in the hole.’”217
Callahan has a different take. To Callahan, Skid Row was not “created” and there
was no effort at “containment.” On the contrary, in her view, Skid Row is just where the
single-occupancy housing is:
Rows across the country exist for a very simple reason—it’s where the
housing is, and the missions come in to serve. So these were the rail yards, all
along Alameda and Central. . . . A lot of single guys came to work on the
railroads, to work on loading and unloading. So you had a lot of hotels that were
single rooms. Then on Main Street you had the really fancy hotels. . . And like all
cities, as they grow, it then just began to grow in the other direction. As L.A.
grew west then this area began to be inhabited by the poor. By the 20s, the poor
were here and not leaving. So it’s because the housing is here. Nobody built new
housing for them. . . . And so then the missions came in to begin serving people
who were living here, and who needed those services. . . . I mean the Row was
where it was because that’s where the largest amount of single occupancy hotels
were.
Nobody creates a skid. Skid Row is created on its own, and that’s why
in every city, find the bus station and you’ll find your Skid Row. That’s where
every Skid Row is. It’s always the part of downtown where the stage coach used
to come in. It’s always the downtown, and then everybody flees, and the housing
for the single occupancy stays where it is, and a different tenant moves in.218
In this sense, Callahan believes, there was no “containment” effort. There was no
conspiracy. It was something completely different:
No. There was a thing, and it’s always mischaracterized completely. In the
70s, there was a group set up to look at the Row. It was the redevelopment
agency at that point, the Catholic workers, and a hand full of people in the 70s
216
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who got together and looked at it. It was an effort to protect the housing. Not an
effort to contain. It didn’t come from the outside, as people are saying. . . .
The idea for containment was not a negative one done by businesses. It was
an idea to try to protect the housing, and it was the understanding that everybody
downtown was going to lose their housing, sort of like Bunker Hill. It was to
protect the neighborhood. So it wasn’t a negative thing it was actually an
enlightened plan. It was the community redevelopment agency beginning in the
60s through the 70s and just into the mid 80’s had a great group of really
enlightened planners, and their whole effort was to save the housing.
They wanted to create what they call buffer zones around the Row so that we
didn’t get industries on the borders of the Row that would threaten. . . . It was to
save the housing for the thousands of people. And the premise was that unless
you solve the Skid Row housing problem, you couldn’t solve any issue downtown
and you couldn’t solve the Skid Row problem unless you housed people in
housing of dignity. It was the redevelopment agency that thought up the plan to
purchase and rehabilitate and manage the housing on the Row.
All we are doing is we are the last remaining believers in the redevelopment
agency plan from the 70s and 80s. We have no other agenda but that plan. It was
great plan, it was unlike other cities.219
Again, not everyone agrees. To Gilmore, the idea of centralizing the homeless into
one area and clustering all the services there is just a “bad idea.”220 Fortunately, he argues,
the times are changing:
LA is really the victim of some really bad 60’s and 70’s logic that found its
home in LA, and I’m a product of that 60’s and 70’s logic too, but there is a new
political and social dynamic occurring in this regeneration of downtown Los
Angeles. . . . It’s highly responsive, certainly receptive to different notions of how
to deal with homeless issues, how to deal with law and order issues, how to deal
with social equity issues, and how to do mixed income, development housing, you
know, all this kind of stuff, and that is extraordinarily appealing. It doesn’t make
any of the problems easier, but it’s really interesting that you can end up in a
conversation with the Speaker of the House, the Senator, the Mayor’s office all
here on this corner that used to be the worst corner in Los Angles.221
What is clear from the history, though, is that there are a lot of moving pieces and
different coalitions involved in the evolution of L.A.’s Skid Row. The question now is: How
do the different participants position themselves today? Here matters get murky and
complicated. The merchants in the Skid Row area are happy to see homeless services
moving away—even if not completely away, at least further away. Regarding the possible
relocation of one large mission into the center of the Row, the Times reports, “some toy
219
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district business owners near the current mission said they are happy to see it go. They say it
has hurt business, and they would like to see old property be developed commercially.”222
Tracey Lovejoy, who runs the business improvement association, the CCEA, in the Toy and
Industrial areas, states that “Business has always been the predominant usage in that area. In
reality, we’re getting to the point where the real estate costs are so high that it’s probably the
last time we’ll see a big development devoted to social services. In 50 years, who knows
what this community will look like.”223
The service providers harbor divergent views on how Skid Row should be
developed. The Los Angeles Homeless Services Authority, a city and county agency that
distributes federal and local funds, has “put a hold on awarding new grants to social service
projects downtown to discourage further concentration of such programs.”224 They tend to
want to reorient the homeless out toward more distant county shelters, and are offering to
bus the homeless out of Skid Row. At the same time, the LAHSA tends to see a bright side
to downtown development. Gentrification may have a “positive effect because policymakers
can no longer ignore conditions if more affluent people complain.”225
One of the largest missions, the ninety-year-old Midnight Mission, is planning a
major expansion of its operations.226 Previously located at the corner of 4th and Los Angeles
Streets, the Mission is building a new, larger facility located a few blocks away.227 The
facility will be located at the corner of 6th and San Pedro Street. It will move closer to the
warehouse heart of Skid Row, and out of the Toy District in the North-West fringe. Its
neighbors will include the Union Rescue Mission, the Weingart Center, and the Downtown
Drop-In Center. The cost of the new facility is $17 million and it is funded entirely by
private funds.228 It will increase the number of homeless beds from 160 to almost 300. It will
also include 128,000 square feet of office, parking, and storage space, a larger dining area
222
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serving 450 people up from 128, a library, gym, and a large bank of restrooms.229 The
facility will displace a light industrial plant that housed a perfume and make-up distribution
center.230
The L.A. Times raised the question on everyone’s mind in its article: Midnight
Mission Growing Even as Downtown Gentrifies; Construction of a facility for the homeless
raises questions about how the indigent will coexist with new loft dwellers.231 According to
the Times, the new facility “may be one of the last major expansions of social services in the
downtown area because of rising real estate prices and a new determination by city officials
to disperse such homeless programs throughout the county.”232 In the meantime, though, the
question is, how will the homeless and the young urban professionals share this space—a
space that, as the Times suggests, is being “invigorated by new cultural institutions and
burgeoning numbers of high-end loft dwellers.”233
The Midnight Mission plans will deal with the demographic changes, in part,
through the design of the space itself. The Mission will build a large inner courtyard in order
to accommodate the homeless, get them off the street, and keep the neighborhood more
orderly in appearance. The enclosed inner courtyard is designed so that “long lines of
homeless people don’t have to wait outside for food and services.”234 In addition, there will
be lots of private security, including twenty-four hour uniformed security guards. All this is
intended to improve neighborhood aesthetics. According to Midnight Mission President
Larry Adamson, “I think we’re going to improve the neighborhood, especially compared to
what is there now. If we can get people off the streets, I don’t see how that’s going to make
things worse.”235
City Hall, for its part, has supported the provision of funding for Skid Row lowincome housing. At the same time, they also support the developers. So, for instance, they
are supporting Tom Gilmore’s plan to develop the Old Bank District by means of a tax
credit and more favorable building codes.236 In 1999, Los Angeles passed an adaptive use
ordinance to encourage precisely this type of redevelopment. The city ordinance relaxes
229
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environmental quality, disability, fire and safety, parking, height and floor space, and
commercial corner development regulations237—all on top of state and federal tax credits.238
In January 2000, City Hall designated the Fashion District, neighboring south of Skid row,
as part of a nineteen-square mile “Empowerment Zone” because of the poverty levels, as an
area intended to attract new businesses. The benefits of locating in the Empowerment Zone
include tax benefits—a cap on city taxes for established businesses and exemption from
business taxes for start-ups—as well as access to low interest loans, wage credits, and
various subsidies for city services.”239
The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) is also a player
in these controversies, but it is not always clear whose side they end up helping. The
problem is, at least according to the homeless activists, that the federal housing codes are too
demanding and too expensive.240 HUD-sponsored renovations of SROs cost in average
between $50,000 and $100,000 per unit and generally result in lower numbers of units per
SRO.241 In contrast, private renovations cost around $10,000 per unit.242 The difference has
to do with the fact that HUD regulations require that renovated units have their own
bathroom and kitchen, and that all work be done at top union wages.243 In contrast, private
renovations usually result in single-room occupancy efficiencies, with shared toilet and
kitchen facilities, and are usually constructed at below union wages.244 So, for instance,
according to the Atlantic, “HUD recently underwrote the renovation of an SRO in San
Francisco, the Padre Hotel, at a cost of $80,000 per unit. In the process of meeting HUD
codes, the number of units in the building was reduced from a hundred to forty-one,
diminishing the poverty-level housing stock by fifty-nine in the act of preserving it. Another
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SRO hotel, the Aarti, in the same neighborhood of San Francisco, was improved without
federal funds. The Aarti’s renovation cost per unit is estimated to total only $8,000, and the
total number of dwellings in the building will decline by only eight, from fifty to fortytwo.”245
Advocates for the homeless—other than Alice Callahan—are often ambivalent. They
are caught in the middle of the redevelopment, and, at times, divided. Some, or even maybe
“most” of the social service providers, as the Los Angeles Magazine seems to suggest,
“welcome the jobs the [renovated El Dorado] hotel and restaurants will bring.”246 These
service providers often themselves hire the homeless—as do local businesses and even the
BIDS.247
What then is the future of L.A.’s Skid Row? The answer is hard to know. This is, as I
emphasize from the start, an experiment in real time. Nevertheless, I ask Tom Gilmore first:
I think its hard to predict 20 years out even here, but I think the institutions of
Union Rescue Mission, the Los Angeles Mission, Weingart, and Midnight will be
there for twenty to forty years and I think that any rational long term plan must
include them as participants in that plan. The heads of all those institutions are
actually very good partners in trying to find a street life that is acceptable to the
broadest level of the community. The problem is—and that’s why I really do
think we should walk over there tonight—the idea that that street life is
acceptable is absurd to anybody, and yet unless we find a way to bring an
economic reality over there that says we are all living side by side and we all
have a standard that’s this high, unless we do that, they will always get the short
end of the stick, and the answer scarily enough for the far right and the very far
left is that its okay over there like that, that somehow that’s a scenario that is
reasonable when in fact, I think its unjustifiable.
Harcourt: But so, what do we do? I mean, do we just build more affordable
housing, because that’s not affordable housing right there.
Gilmore: No, because if we’re walking over there, seven out of ten, eight out
of ten of the people we will walk past, you can put them in a home tomorrow and
they aren’t going to stay there. They have an issue. They have a substance abuse
issue. 90 percent of them, a lot of them, scarily enough, just got released from
twin towers jail tonight or yesterday, so housing’s not the answer, but housing is
one of the answers. Housing is part one, I go off way off on a limb,
245
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decriminalization of drugs is step two, and treatment instead of jail is step three.
As for Alice Callahan, she too is optimistic about the future. She sees the silver
lining:
Here’s the good news. The immediate impact of [Gilmore buying on 4th and
Main] was to make it impossible for us to buy housing on Main Street. That’s a
huge impact. But again, taking the long view of everything, what happened is
[Gilmore] did spark it. But the critics are right, he won’t make it probably, but
lots of people will.
What we have seen, in the last couple of years, is thousands of more
units coming on line, of lofts for people who want their Manhattan experience, in
the Downtown area, but not on Skid Row. And they are all outside of Skid Row.
In the garment District, in South Park, on Bunker Hill, in Little Tokyo.
So people who might look at something [here in Skid Row] have to
say to themselves: “So why do I spend all that money to be here. I even have
more of a Manhattan experience if I go over here to the Garment District, and I
feel safe at night. Or if I go over here to the Artist Area.
So now, suddenly people can have their wonderful Manhattan
experience and live Downtown, and do it safely and do it in a place where they
do not have to step over the homeless. So my hope is, and I think it will be true, is
that indeed Gilmore will fail. He will have sparked something, but he will not be
the benefactor of it.248

V.

Conclusion: Rethinking Deviance and Disorder
I personally would not venture a guess as to the future of L.A.’s Skid Row, nor take

sides in these ongoing real estate battles. But I confess, as I step back from all I’ve seen,
heard, read, and experienced, I have this nagging sense that the developers and the SRO
advocates, curiously, may have something in common. Oddly enough, their interests may be
aligned in one crucial respect: the high-end loft developers may not really want to get rid of
the “Skid Row flavor” of Skid Row. It is not at all clear to me that they want to eliminate all
the homelessness or the missions. That after all is precisely what gives the neighborhood its
edge. It is what makes Downtown L.A. feel like the lower-Manhattan of the early Soho,
TriBeCa, and East Village. It is what makes a young professional feel like an urban pioneer.
Listen closely to Cedd Moses—recall, he is renovating the El Dorado.
Redevelopment should gentrify the neighborhood, “but not completely,” Moses says.
“Retaining an inclusive mix of people will help make the area more cosmopolitan, more
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creative.”249 Somehow, this mix will preserve “the neighborhood’s edgy vibe.”250
Listen closely to Tom Gilmore: “I actually believe that on some level the existence
of poor and potentially homeless people or borderline people is not antithetical to a healthy
urban environment. It’s really more the stuff that you are seeing on the surface, which is
people living in boxes, people who are, to a very large extent, involved in some level of
substance abuse, mental illness.”251
Listen closely to the media accounts: these developers envision “a harmonious
mixing of black-clothed bohos and techie business types with the current populace, which
includes Latin American merchants, street people, location film crews and artists living in
lofts near the Los Angeles River.”252
It almost sounds as if the developers may have an interest in keeping Skid Row noir,
edgy, frontier-like, in order to attract the young urban pioneers—that “different kind of
animal,” as Gilmore likes saying.253 This is precisely what drives Alice Callahan mad:
He actually will tell you that. He will say “I don’t have a problem with the
homeless. I am for them. I support service agencies on the Row. I do that.”
. . . I mean, for him to come into an area as if this were benign, to buy on the
Row, and say “Well, I just bought a building that was not housing anyone,”
knowing that he has impacted the housing for thousands of the poorest for whom
there is no replacement housing and there never will be, for whom probably they
will lose their housing on the Row, is unconscionable. He is either incredibly
stupid or he is incredibly amoral. He doesn’t care. He is making his profit, he is
pocketing his money. So I don’t have any patience.254
Tom Gilmore sees this tension, but seizes on it in order to project his unique identity
as developer and concerned citizen. Is Gilmore genuine? Or is it a cover—the Trojan horse
that will get him and other high-end loft developers into Skid Row? Could these real estate
developers see a silver lining to the homeless problems on L.A.’s Skid Row? My curiosity
and interest, to be honest, is not to probe the actual intentions, desires, or morality of the
developers, but instead to highlight this curious and uncomfortable alignment of interests.
I had thought, at first blush, that the interests of the developers would be
diametrically opposed to the interests of the homeless advocates and non-profit SRO-
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operators. But the reality, I now believe, is far more complex. It is likely that any future
inroads into the gentrification of L.A.’s Skid Row may depend precisely on this
uncomfortable alliance.
The homeless and the edgy, noir, urban pioneers—these do make strange
bedfellows. To be sure, if the developers succeed, the urban pioneers will most likely be
displaced some day in the near future by more conventional loft-dwellers, and L.A.’s Skid
Row will become mainstream high-end, like so much of the formerly-edgy lower
Manhattan. Whether they succeed, however, may turn on this uncomfortable alignment.
This all raises a lot more questions than it answers. Could it be that disorder and
deviance serve as a marketing device for a bohemian, Skid Row, real estate niche? Is crime
and homelessness something that renters or loft owners may consume? Is it possible that
Skid Row might be worth less to some urban pioneers if the disorderliness disappears?
Could it be that these young urban pioneers would prefer to maintain the Skid Row flavor,
not only to keep the cost-of-living down, but because it tastes good?
It would be important, in order to test this hypothesis, to compare the rent or price of
lofts on Skid Row to that of lofts in the immediate vicinity. To be sure, as noted earlier, the
real estate values are lower on Skid Row than in the larger Downtown business area. But is
there a difference between a loft on Skid Row and a loft three blocks away in the Arts
District?
Some preliminary data suggests that the rents may not be that different:255
Building
On Skid Row:
Gilmore’s Hellman Building
Gilmore’s San Fernando

Location

Avg. Unit SF

Avg. Rental

Avg. Rental/SF

Main and Fourth
Main and Fourth

1,495
1,010

$2,023
$1,545

$1.35
$1.53

Spring and Fourth
Broadway and Eighth
Broadway and Third

1,452
1,540

$1,748
$1,965

$1.20
$1.28

900
n/a

$1,425
$1,700

$1.58
n/a

Off Skid Row:
Gilmore’s Continental
Building
The Orpheum Lofts
Grand Central Square 2BR
Apartments
Spring Tower Lofts

255

Spring and Sixth

The data here is collected from the website of the Downtown Center Business Improvement District,
Listing of Downtown Residential Properties, available at http://downtownla.com/living_here.asp.
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But more systematic data would be needed here. And many other questions, of course, arise.
Does redevelopment shift patterns of criminal offending, displacing the street disorderliness
with other forms of deviance? Does redevelopment bring the police into the neighborhood in
a more conspicuous manner, in order to protect the young professionals? How does the
political economy of real estate redevelopment intersect with policing and crime?
Los Angeles’ Skid Row is an evolving experiment on disorder in urban
neighborhoods. The story unfolds under our eyes—a story in which the police seem to play
a backseat role to high-end real estate developers, SRO advocates, and city planning.
Perhaps one of the most intriguing aspects in the plot is the symbiotic relationship between
urban downtown chic and the destitute: the idea that a New York-style, edgy feeling in
downtown Los Angeles may require a bit of well-managed homelessness.
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